Unread Reports, Unchecked Risks

Who read the reports? Who considered the warnings? Who signed off on the risks?

At Senate Estimates, I asked officials from the Department of Defence whether the officer responsible for operational airworthiness had read key reports, considered critical safety assessments, and reviewed evidence relating to the approval of TopOwl 5.10.

Did he read the German report? Defence couldn’t say.

Did he read the Navy test report in full? Defence couldn’t say.

Was he aware of Army test findings that raised serious flight safety concerns? Defence couldn’t say.

Question after question was taken on notice.

This isn’t about hindsight. It’s about understanding what evidence was considered, what warnings were known, and how decisions affecting the safety of Australian aircrew were made.

Those answers matter.

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you, Chair, and thank you all for appearing. Thank you for your service to the country and our defence forces. You’ve already said, Group Captain Smith, that you didn’t watch Wilson and Lamb this morning. Is that correct?  

Group Capt. Smith: Yes, Sir.  

Senator ROBERTS: Are you aw re that your statements are littered with the words ‘probably’, ‘likely’, ‘could be’. Th aey were very, very definite because they had actually come to a definite conclusion as to what would happen under the circumstances of this helicopter using TopOwl if they engaged that in flight. Are you aware?  

Group Capt. Smith: Are you referring to the verbal probability expressions the investigators use?  

Senator ROBERTS: I’m referring to you not being concrete, whereas Wilson and Lamb were concrete in saying, ‘Under these circumstances, this will happen.’  

Group Capt. Smith: I can’t comment on the views or opinions of Mr Lamb or Mr Wilson.  

Senator ROBERTS: Have you consulted Mr Lamb or Mr Wilson?  

Group Capt. Smith: No, I have not.  

Senator ROBERTS: Not at all? The most experienced and qualified test pilot in Australian Navy and Australian Defence Force history.  

Group Capt. Smith: I’m not aware of the comparison of their qualifications compared to other ADF pilots.  

Senator ROBERTS: My questions go to airworthiness and approval, not just of TopOwl but also the aircraft itself, training and approved training schemes, and the processes in the Army. Do you consider that the advice and the roles played by Fenwick, Norton and Lynch are independent? Yes or no?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Sorry. Can you clarify—when you say the roles were independent.  

Senator ROBERTS: What roles did they play? If you could perhaps describe the roles of Fenwick, Norton and Lynch and then whether or not you consider that to be independent.  

Major Gen. Hafner: In terms of the process that’s applied here and in this circumstance of introducing the helmet-mounted sighting device, the HMSD, referred to as the TopOwl, I believe we heard this morning that you have the pilot’s helmet and a visor system, which is the helmet-mounted sighting device referred to as the TopOwl because it actually has a couple of big circular areas on the front, which is where the image is projected. But really—  

Senator ROBERTS: Can you tell us their roles and whether or not you consider them to be independent?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Their role is within the Army Military Air Operator organisation, which then conducts a sequence in accordance with the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations.  

Senator ROBERTS: What did John Fenwick do? 

Major Gen. Hafner: His role was as the Director-General Army Aviation and he participated—  

Senator ROBERTS: David Lynch?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Colonel David Lynch at the time was the director of operational airworthiness.  

Senator ROBERTS: And Norton?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Norton was one of our experienced qualified test pilots and qualified flying instructors.  

Senator ROBERTS: Do you consider them to be independent in regard to the assessment after the crash?  

Major Gen. Hafner: I would say that they didn’t conduct an assessment after the crash. What I would say is they were involved in the process to introduce the helmet-mounted sighting device software version 5.10, an upgraded version of the software, which brought a number of enhancements above the previous software version, which, through some of the test reports, is reflected as improving the situational awareness for our pilots. So they were involved in the introduction process, which then was independently assured by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority before that item was released into service.  

Senator ROBERTS: Let’s focus on Director of Operations Airworthiness, David Lynch. If you can’t answer the question, just take it on notice please, and maybe consult with him. At the time, he recommended approval of the HMSD version 5.10. That’s TopOwl, right?  

Major Gen. Hafner: That is the software version that enables the system.  

Senator ROBERTS: At the time, did he have a working knowledge of the DASRs?  

Major Gen. Hafner: As the Director of Operational Airworthiness, that awareness and functioning within the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations is a normal part of the duties of that appointment.  

Senator ROBERTS: As part of the DASR approval process, the manufacturer provided documentation showing the HMSD version 5.10 software could be loaded into the MRH-90 and function without causing interference, so it’s accepted that the system was, from a technical engineering perspective, safe to install. But what evidence did Lynch consider to determine that the software was safe for use by Australian crews in the MRH-90 role and operating environment?  

Major Gen. Hafner: There’s a range of inputs to the introduction of service of an item. There are obviously technical aspects, but then there are operational tests and there are operational procedures as well, so you need to look at it all holistically. In this case, once the technical certification is done by our chief engineer for that aircraft then you consider the varying test reports that you have on the system in terms of its operational usage. In this case, like I said, each of the test reports from the Army aviation test and evaluation section from our Navy’s flight test organisation and then through that further test and evaluation by a range of very experienced test pilots and instructors, all of that really helped to characterise what AATES had initially identified in this pitch issue, which then resulted in procedures being applied within our publications so that the aircrew have an understanding of what the limitations of this system are for safe employment. It also resulted in the development of training, which all of the pilots were required to undertake before they were permitted to operate with this system. And that’s all designed so that you understand the bounds within which this system is used to enable safe flight operations. That would have all been considered within that passageway through those individuals.  

Senator ROBERTS: So let’s work through some evidence in chronological order that I’ve been told is or should have been considered. Did Lynch consider the German report as evidence supporting that the software was safe for use by Australian crews in the Australian role and environment?  

Major Gen. Hafner: I’m unaware to what degree the contents of that report were considered. I am aware that the knowledge of that report was available at the time.  

Senator ROBERTS: At the time, did he actually read the report?  

Major Gen. Hafner: I can’t comment on that 

Senator ROBERTS: Can you take that on notice and ask him?  

Major Gen. Hafner: We can take that on notice.  

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Can you confirm it was a classified NATO report and not available to non-NATO members?  

Senator ROBERTS: My understanding is that no-one in Australia had access to it.  

Major Gen. Hafner: Look, if I can take that on question on notice then we’ll be able to confirm.  

Senator ROBERTS: He then supposedly considered the Navy test report. Would that be correct?  

Major Gen. Hafner: That’s correct.  

Senator ROBERTS: At the time, had he read that report in full?  

Major Gen. Hafner: I couldn’t answer on behalf of Colonel Lynch.  

Senator ROBERTS: Could you take that on notice?  

Major Gen. Hafner: I’d need to take that on notice.  

Senator ROBERTS: Now it’s agreed that, in general terms, the Navy said TopOwl software was safe to use when operating to a ship—correct?  

Major Gen. Hafner: The report deemed the helmet-mounted software device software version 5.10 as satisfactory. But as I said, it recommended further operational test and evaluation in a land low-level environment, particularly with reference to the pitch scale information.  

Senator ROBERTS: So was he aware that the Navy report actually recommended AATES conduct an assessment to see if the software was safe to use in roles in environments other than operating to a ship?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Again, I wouldn’t be in a position to speak on behalf of what Colonel Lynch knew or did not know, or read or did not read.  

Senator ROBERTS: Could you take it on notice?  

Major Gen. Hafner: We can.  

Senator ROBERTS: He then considered the AATES report. At that time, had he read the report?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Again, the line of questioning is very much asking what an individual did, knowing that I wasn’t that individual, so I’d be reticent to answer on his behalf.  

Senator ROBERTS: We do a lot of preparation in my office, as I think Senator Shoebridge does, and Senator Cadell, and we were hoping Colonel Lynch would be here, but he’s not, so you’re the man responsible. Was he aware that AATES assessed that the software version represented an unacceptable risk to flight safety, implying a very high risk of multiple deaths?  

Major Gen. Hafner: As I’ve indicated, through that introduction process, the test reports from the Army Aviation test evaluation section from our Navy’s flight test organisation and then through the subsequent operational test and evaluation, were all considered as part of the introduction of service sequence.  

Senator ROBERTS: I’d like a specific answer. Was Colonel Lynch aware?  

Major Gen. Hafner: I’ll take that on notice.  

Senator ROBERTS: Yes, that’s fine. I’ll give you some context. You probably already know this but for others in the room, the Defence aircraft safety design requirements manual apparently states that compliance with the recognised airworthiness code underpins safe flight. It outlines that airworthiness code compliance contributes to Defence meeting its legal obligations under the Workplace Health and Safety Act. It specifically requires that major changes such as software in version 5.10 be airworthiness code compliant. Was Colonel Lynch aware that the federal aviation regulations are DASR-approved airworthiness codes?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Again, I wouldn’t be in a position to answer what another individual knew or didn’t know at that time. I can take that on notice.  

Senator ROBERTS: Was Lynch aware that AATES report included the formal assessment that HMSD version 5.10 was non-compliant with federal aviation regulations airworthiness codes?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Again, any of the commentary regarding what Colonel Lynch knew or didn’t know, I think they’re questions I’d need to take on notice to take back to Colonel Lynch. I wouldn’t like to speak on the individual’s behalf. What I can say to you is all of those elements were considered as part of the introduction into service process.  

Senator ROBERTS: Take this on notice, please: at the time, did he have any evidence to show version 5.10 was compliant with any DASR recognised airworthiness code?  

Major Gen. Hafner: We’ll take that on notice.  

Senator ROBERTS: On notice: did he then consider the Langley-Norton operational evaluation, which in broad terms said version 5.10 was safe?  

Major Gen. Hafner: Again, I want to absolutely help the committee here—  

CHAIR: Can I perhaps assist? Senator Roberts, if you’ll allow, if you’ve got questions in that third-party context, perhaps they could all be provided on notice in bulk, and then we could—  

Senator ROBERTS: I think that might be the best thing to do.  

CHAIR: If I can assist in suggesting that. Then, if you’ve got questions that are for those that are here—  

Senator ROBERTS: These are all questions for Colonel Lynch, so we might as well cut through—  

Major Gen. Hafner: As I said, I’m very much trying to assist the committee; it’s just that I wouldn’t like to speak to what another individual knew or didn’t know. I think I would be speaking out of place in that regard. What I can speak to is the process and what the organisation had worked through in terms of whether those elements were considered. I can speak to that.  

Senator ROBERTS: I’m happy with that. He was director of operational airworthiness, as you know. His rank was colonel. If you could just get his answers to questions on notice.  

Major Gen. Hafner: Absolutely. Will do, Senator.  

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you.