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Snowy 2.0 continues to throw good money after bad

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I questioned the Snowy Hydro Authority on the Snowy 2.0 project at Senate Estimates.

Snowy 2.0 is a ‘big battery’ that pumps water from the Talbingo Reservoir up to the Tantangara Reservoir during the day when there is excess wind and solar electricity, then lets the water down during the evening peak to generate electricity when the sun isn’t shining and wind isn’t blowing.

If this sounds like we are planning on generating electricity twice to use it once, that is exactly what pumped hydro does.

The original cost of $2 billion is now out to $5.9 billion and likely to go over $10 billion. In addition, the transmission lines to bring the power into the grid will gouge out national parks and farmland, and cost another $10 billion. And their main boring machine has been bogged for more than a year.

I asked if this project is worth continuing.

The lack of detail around how much the power will cost electricity customers is frightening.

Listen to the answers. It sounds like the Snowy Authority is planning to profiteer by having the only power available when solar and wind are not generating enough power.

All I can say is be worried – this Government is actively planning massive increases in power bills.

Transcript

Senator Roberts: Thank you for appearing again today. Florence is now acknowledged to be bogged. When will it be unbogged?

Mr Barnes: I expect in weeks, not months. As soon as the slurry plant is operating, we’ll push forward, obviously in close consultation with our colleagues at DPIE and Parks, but we expect it to be relatively soon.

Senator Roberts: I empathise with you, having managed underground projects, some quite large—not as large as this one. There is a lot of uncertainty, and it’s hard telling people who are looking on how to think about this. It’s very difficult to describe.

Mr Barnes: You’ve got to see it to believe it.

Senator Roberts: That’s right. We’ve got journalists—admittedly journalists—now saying it’s time to cut our losses on Snowy 2.0. If the project is completed and all the high-voltage transmission lines are built across farmyards and national parks, there must be a calculation that takes the capital cost of the project as a whole and divides that by the life of the project to get a figure for how much the annual amortisation charge for the capital costs will be. Do you have the latest projection, please?

Mr Barnes: There was quite a lot in your question. Obviously we haven’t got an updated cost here, and we’ll provide that in months. We don’t have the cost of transmission, so I wouldn’t be able to provide that. I fully expect, through our corporate plan process, we’ll assess the returns from Snowy 2.0, and, if anything, the commercial case for it has got stronger since FID.

Senator Roberts: Sorry?

Mr Barnes: The commercial case for it has gotten stronger since the financial investment decision.

Senator Roberts: There were many factors that drove that commercial decision in the first place. Well, it wasn’t commercial, from what we understand, because there was no cost-benefit analysis, and the business case was redacted heavily, under Malcolm Turnbull’s prime ministership. This annual amortisation charge, which you can’t provide, is combined with annual costs like labour and maintenance to calculate what the real cost per megawatt hour will be once the project starts. You wouldn’t have the projected cost per megawatt hour either then?

Mr Barnes: That’s correct, but to think about Snowy 2.0 in megawatt hours is perhaps not the right way to think about it.

Senator Roberts: It’s a battery.

Mr Barnes: Yes, but it’s the provision of dispatchable demand over very long storage duration that allows lots of variable renewable electricity to be delivered. So we look at the business case in a much more fulsome way across the whole Snowy business. For example, over the past few years, we’ve procured 1,500 megawatts of solar and wind PPAs to enable the transition, which assets like Snowy 2.0 support. I think you’ve got to look at a whole-of-business business case, and the simple amortisation plus labour is, perhaps, too simplistic a way to consider the business case.

Senator Roberts: Now you’ve got me really worried. It’s not your responsibility with the solar and wind, but now I’m terrified of it. Your website lists the levelised cost of storage at between $25 and $35 per megawatt hour. On 340,000 megawatt hours each year, this suggests an annual cost of $11 million, including operating costs, maintenance, capital costs and the cost of buying the electricity to pump the water uphill. Is the $25 to $35 figure still accurate and, if not, what is the new figure?

Mr Barnes: I’ve not got a calculator that capable in my head, but I think there might be a multiplying factor out on those numbers. The levelised cost of storage I think we have on our website is sourced from international studies and our view of levelised cost of storage. I don’t have the updated figure in my head at the moment.

Senator Roberts: Our staff team did some calculations. Now, admittedly, we don’t have all the costs, but it just seems ridiculously low. When we pile on these extra costs of the delay, we’re wondering about what will happen.

Mr Barnes: Just to be clear, the levelised cost of storage is what one would add to variable renewable electricity to provide a firm product. Also, the 340,000 megawatt hours of storage is not deployed over a year. It will be deployed multiple times through the year, depending on the market dynamics.

Senator Roberts: It seems to us that the capital cost is becoming a huge stumbling block. Even if you take just the cost of the project, at $6 billion—and there are serious doubts about that now—and amortise those across 50 years, the annual capital charge will be $120 million, and double that if you add the pole and the wires. That puts the cost of your electricity at over $700 per megawatt per hour, including the poles and wires. The current spot price for last weekend—admittedly the weekend was cold down here—for last weekend was $150 per megawatt hour. Is there something we’re missing?

Mr Barnes: We’ll certainly do a full financial review of the project when the increased costs are known. But I think you’re mischaracterising the nature of the asset in that it isn’t an energy provider. It’s an insurance provider for when the wind isn’t blowing, the sun isn’t shining or there is plant failure elsewhere. So we don’t sell it as a baseload energy price, which is what you’re referencing.

Senator Roberts: Hasn’t it been touted as a peak period source of electricity?

Mr Barnes: The two major sources of revenue will be the difference between the price we pump the water up to Tantangara, which will soak up demand from solar and wind when it’s not required, and the price at which we sell it in peak periods when solar and wind aren’t available or other plants are not available. So it’s an asset about being there when everything else isn’t. It isn’t sold on an energy basis, which are the reference prices you’re quoting.

Senator Roberts: Okay. But the projected cost must be the single most important KPI of this project.

Mr Barnes: Cost and schedule are my most important KPIs. The reason we came out with the schedule is that there are many stakeholders interested in the schedule, and we’ll work through the cost and associated business plans around that.

Senator Roberts: There seems to be a real risk, though. I acknowledge your point that we can’t just charge per kilowatt hour—or we can’t just recognise a per kilowatt hour figure. But there seems to be the real possibility that the price of electricity generated, recovered and stored will be massive, even without government subsidies coming in year after year.

Ms Barnes: I think that’s for others to comment on. My focus is on getting the project at schedule and cost and making a business case for it, which I think is very strong. There are many other factors which will determine the price of electricity.

Senator Roberts: Minister, can you provide on notice the current projected cost per megawatt hour of electricity generated by Snowy 2.0 on the first year of operation, please?

Senator McAllister: Senator, I will take that on notice. I would also direct you to the evidence given to you already by Mr Barnes in relation both to the variability in the electricity market that Snowy will participate in but also—

Senator Roberts: A lot of variability means uncertainty.

Senator McAllister: Senator Roberts, I think that Mr Barnes has given an indication that he thinks it’s a strong business case and they’re presently working through it. I have taken your question on notice.

Senator Roberts: Thank you. This had nothing to do with your government, but right from the start of this project, Malcolm Turnbull’s government refused access to the cost-benefit analysis and heavily redacted the business case. There have been lots of questions about this project right from the start and now there are even more questions—and I don’t blame Mr Barnes for that.

Mr Barnes: My interest is running a commercially viable and efficient company, and that’s what I’ve done all of my career. The reason I joined Snowy was to get the opportunity to deliver Snowy 2, because I think it’s an incredibly important asset to the energy transition. I fully expect it to be very commercial. We’re trying to deal with the hardest part of the transition, which is providing deep storage to enable more renewables. So I expect it to be a very commercial business.

Senator Roberts: Can I confirm media reports that Snowy Hydro was found in a third independent audit last year to be noncompliant on environmental plans in 15 instances and that you have at last 10 management plans overdue?

Mr Barnes: I think, Senator, that you’re maybe referring to a National Parks Association report that was released last Thursday, without consultation with Snowy Hydro. We are currently operating under all of our construction approvals. So there are no breaches there. The plans and requirements as a result of the construction and operation of Snowy 2 obviously changed in nature over time. There are some that are relevant to construction, and we’re fully compliant with those. There are some that are relevant to operation and some that are relevant to rehabilitation. We work closely with all of the agencies to make sure that they’re reviewed and consulted on in every thorough way. I think there’s been a misunderstanding of some of the dates on various websites. So I have reached out to the National Parks Association to help them understand how it operates.

Senator Roberts: So it’s a misunderstanding that 10 of the 16 management plans for multibillion-dollar pumped hydro projects are overdue by 31 months, as reported in the media, citing the National Parks Association? So you think they’ve got it wrong somewhere?

Mr Barnes: The plans that are being referred to are prepared by Snowy and they are reviewed by various agencies. In consultation with the agencies, some of the dates that were originally envisaged are not being met and, therefore, are phases of the project which are way into the future. One of the things that may be useful for us to do is to work with the various agencies to make that understanding of how this process works. I would have happily taken the National Parks Association through that process.

Senator Roberts: Okay; so they jumped the gun?

Mr Barnes: They didn’t consult with Snowy Hydro before releasing it to the media.

Senator Roberts: Can I go to your opening statement? You recently announced a one- to two-year delay.  That’s a heck of a range, 100 per cent—from minimum to major.

Mr Barnes: It’s a project that’s being constructed over more than one to two years. It’s been in construction a few years. I think it was appropriate to give a range until we do more work.

Senator Roberts: I appreciate your honesty. I am not questioning your honesty—and I appreciate that you have given us that figure. But, for the project, that’s a pretty big number. What was the original planned project duration?

Mr Barnes: It was before my time. Perhaps we’ll come back to you. We gave a notice to proceed in mid-2020 and power was expected in 2025-26.

Mr Whitby: First power was for 1 July 2025, from a notice to proceed from August 2020. So five years was the original—

Senator Roberts: So the delay is 20 per cent to 40 per cent?

Mr Barnes: That would be the simple maths.

Chair: Senator Roberts, I’ll get you to wind it up and share the call, if that’s okay?

Senator Roberts: Okay. You mentioned in your statement the combination of four factors. What are the four factors? I’ve been through your statement and I couldn’t see them.

Mr Barnes: In our advice to ministers and in our media release we identified the effects of COVID and bushfires on the mobilisation of the project, the effect of many global factors on the availability of skilled labour and also the costs of materials. There’s a lot of steel and concrete in the project. We’ve found that some elements of the design—as we’ve gone through the process of design—are, in some cases, more costly to complete. And finally, the site conditions, of which the Florence ground conditions are the most impactful, also includes things like additional eroding. They’re the four factors.

Senator Roberts: Good luck getting that machine out.

Mr Barnes: Thanks.

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Former Snowy 2.0 Boss slams Bowen’s Wind and Solar plan: “Bull***t”

Former Snowy 2.0 boss Paul Broad has just SLAMMED Bowen’s ‘transition to renewables’, calling it ‘bull***t’.

“The notion that you can have 80% renewable in our system by 2030 is, to use the vernacular, bull***t. The truth is, this transition, if it ever occurs, will take 80 years, not eight.”

Couldn’t have said it better myself, Paul.

Transcript

Ben: 17 minutes after 7:00. Well, we’ve said this line a number of times, don’t jump off the boat until you’ve reached the shore, and we say it about Australia’s dramatic switch to renewable energy. We’re switching off coal at rapid rates. The backup plan isn’t ready to go just yet. Take the massive hydro energy project, Snowy 2.0. It’s long been promised to store enough energy for 3 million homes. The project is disastrously delayed and over budget. The former prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, said in 2017 it would be up and running by 2021. Now they’re saying 2029. It’s gone from a $2 billion price tag to 10 billion, including all of the linked transmission lines.

I wanted to have a chat to someone who knows about this backwards. His name is Paul Broad. He’s one of Australia’s leading experts on infrastructure. Now, Paul Broad was the CEO of Snowy 2.0 for a decade, but his tenure ended shortly after Chris Bowen became the federal energy minister. Paul Broad delivered Mr. Bowen some home truths about how the project was going. He was sent packing shortly after, or maybe he decided to leave. Paul Broad, the former boss of Snowy 2.0 is on the line. Paul, thanks for joining us.

Paul Broad: Thanks. My pleasure, Ben.

Ben: Did you leave or were you shoved?

Paul Broad: Oh, a bit of combination. The word was filtering down. In fact, I think when Bowen was elected, I was dead in the water, so it was only a matter of time. But I formally resigned.

Ben: Why were you dead in the water? What was it that was such a sticking point between where you stand and where Chris Bowen stood?

Paul Broad: Oh, a series of things, particularly the gas plant at Kurri Kurri, Angus Taylor and I were very strong that you needed gas to keep the lights on. And we had more gas in New South Wales than we know what to do with. We need gas. So when the sun’s not shining, wind’s not blowing, gas, hydro are incredibly important. And Chris Bowen was against Kurri Kurri. Then he said we’re going to run Kurri Kurri 30% on hydrogen. There is no hydrogen in the Hunter, and there won’t be for another 10, 20 years at the earliest.

Ben: You were just trying to help, right?

Paul Broad: Well, yeah, trying to help. I think in the 18 months leading up to it, in the senate estimate, the parliament asking us lots of these sort of questions. So you got a sense of where Chris was coming from, and that’s his political view. I respect that, I just didn’t agree with it and there’s no point being somewhere if you don’t agree with it.

Ben: You could have just drunk the Kool-Aid and said, “Oh yeah. No, this is going to be the answer to all of our problems. It’ll be able to carry the load.” But you were being realistic and he didn’t want to hear it?

Paul Broad: Yeah. Plus the fact, the notion that you can have 80% renewable in our system by 2030 is, to use the vernacular, is bullshit. It’s bullshit. Ben, the truth is, this transition, if it ever occurs, it will take 80 years, not eight. So there’s massive changes need to occur. And I’m deeply concerned about the rush, the notion that somehow this is all magic, I’m going to wave a magic wand, we’ll close a big baseload power plant that’s kept our lights on for yours of my life, we’re just going to close it and there’s all these alternatives out there. Well, it’s not. I can be absolutely 100% certain it’s not available, and the transmission lines are miles late. 2.0, which is a part of the thing is late. I think their own reports tell them you’ll need at least eight 2.0s to achieve their goal, and that’s 80 years not eight.

Ben: Let’s just have a look at 2.0. So the biggest issue is these giant tunnelling machines. They weigh 2000 tonnes. They keep falling through the soft ground. Do we know how far along this project is? Is it halfway? Beyond halfway?

Paul Broad: Yeah. Look, I’ve got to defend 2.0, it was a huge part of my creation, and I’m quite proud of the attempt to build a big pumped hydro, but it’s complex. These tunnel-boring machines have got to do through heaps of rock. There’s 28 kilometres of tunnels, 11 metres diameter. And one of them has got to actually bore uphill. So they’ve got to come in and get access to a cabin, and then you’ve got to drill out a cabin, which is 400 metres long, a kilometre under the mountain. So the complexity of this thing is enormous. So I’m not surprised that we’ve got delays. I suppose what worries me more is the lack of transmission.

So you have this big power plant, it’s of no use to you if you haven’t got a transmission line out the front to run it into where the people are. So the lack of transmission is going to be a big, big problem for us. The lack of transmission to bring all these renewables. The power plants we have are just up the road here in the Hunter, all these new renewables are out west or somewhere else. There’s no power lines to get it here. So the notion you can have all this occurring without transmission and all the other investment which will cost the customer, the consumers a lot, the suggestion you can do all that and price is going to come down. It’s just wrong. It’s absolutely wrong. It’s misleading, it’s false and to keep suggesting that, I think eventually, eventually the average punter wakes up, and there’ll be a reaction.

Ben: We’re listening to Paul Broad, the former of boss of Snowy 2.0. Just on the timeline, I actually had a meeting with someone who’s associated with the project about a month or so ago. And I said, “What’s going on with this thing? Because we were told it’d be done by 2021, and now you’re talking about 2027.” And then they said to me, “Oh, it might be late 2027.” And I said, “Well, that sounds to me like 2028.” Now they’re saying December 2029. When I hear December 2029, I think 2030. Realistically, when’s it going to be done?

Paul Broad: Well, the transmission line is ’27, so I suspect they’ll get first power, I suspect… Now something else will happen. I think the challenges for building it are still in front of them. The biggest challenge they have for this whole project is still to come. So there’s lots of risk with it yet, but I suspect, given the fudges the engineers do, I’m suspecting end of ’27, middle of ’27, that sort of timeframe. But Ben, there’s no point having it if the transmission line… So we’ve got to work out, someone’s got to tell us when are the farmers going to agree to run power lines over their properties? When are they going to agree to pay the farmers a reasonable annual sum to access and run their lines over their property? When all that’s agreed and they work out the direction these things are going to come… We haven’t upgraded them in 50 years, let alone in five.

Ben: We’ve spoken to some of those farmers and they’re worried because they say they’ve got to knock down all of these trees to put the lines in. We’re worried about bush fires. And the other issue is just that old line, “It’s my land, it’s my property.”

Paul Broad: Absolutely. Then well what happened, the truth of it, they had all these shiny asses from Sydney rock up to the farms and say, “I’m going to put a power line over your property.” Well, the farmers said, “Get lost. You’re not coming on my property.” It is their livelihood. It is what they live for. So they got off to a really bad start. All the people around Tumut and Gundagai, all those people are now up in arms because these things have got to be done right. You’ve got to sit down and you’ve got to be able to be flexible about the direction you go to minimise the impact on farmers. They had some power lines going right over the farmer’s house.

So there’s still a lot of work to be done on the transmission. There’s still a lot of work to be done on 2.0. And the reports out saying you’re going to need lots of 2.0. So it’s really just the start of the journey. It’s not the end and I think the notion that we can close these plants, no, Eraring can’t, cannot close. Even now, we’re closing Liddell. We’re on a knife’s edge. You watch when it gets really hot or really cold, just how tight it gets in New South Wales. If the lights don’t go out, I’ll be awfully surprised.

Ben: A couple of quick ones, one of the private contractors went into administration in December. We’ve heard there are still unpaid bills to both workers and to ongoing construction.

Paul Broad: Yeah, the contractor’s got a lot to answer for. And I don’t want to go on air and bag a contractor, but they’ve got a lot to answer for. And I think they were trying games by not paying the local small contractors, and as soon I was there, I was prepared to go and pay the contractors ourselves, and then extract it from the big contractor later. The major contractor has safety problems. They tragically lost a life down there a week or so ago. The contractor has a lot of questions to answer. They’re under a fixed-price contract, so these prices shouldn’t be going up, but they are. They’re on a performance-based contract, they’re not performing. There is some big question marks and Clough going broke halfway as well, 12 months ago, it’s been a big problem. The Clough guys were integral part of delivering it. So the contractor has a huge challenge in front of them and they’ve got huge questions to answer.

Ben: Just on question marks, were you hiding some of the delays from Chris Bowen? Because I’ve seen the Financial Review. A spokeswoman for Mr. Bowen told the Financial Review that, “It was no secret that the government was disappointed in the hiding of delays to major energy projects by the former government including Snowy Hydro 2.0.”

Paul Broad: That is just bullshit. The first meeting with Bowen, my first meeting with Bowen, he asked me and I said, “Yeah, 12 to 18 months.” When I was with last meeting with Angus, which was back in April when the contractor rocked into Angus’s office and said that, “We think you’re going to be delaying going [inaudible 00:09:41] cost increase,” Angus kicked him out of the office and said, “It’s got to be delivered on time and on budget.” That’s the truth. I mean why does his office on this political spin? What is he trying to do? Fair dinkum. Why not just tell the truth? It’s really easy. In life, I find if you tell the truth, you can remember it and you don’t get yourself in too much trouble.

Ben: I said at the start of my introduction, that line that a talk back caller said to me once about the switch to renewables, “Don’t jump off the boat until you’ve reached the shore.” Can you reflect on that for a moment before we say goodbye?

Paul Broad: Yeah, that’s absolutely true. We can’t make this transition until we’re absolutely convinced that the alternative’s going to work, and is going to be at a price point that it won’t kill the economy. At the moment, we’ve got neither of those.

Ben: You say the idea of getting to 80% renewables by 2030 is complete BS. You say closer to 80 years?

Paul Broad: Yeah. Well, you got to build these things. Transmission lines, their own reports say you’ll need eight 2.0s or their equivalents. One 2.0 takes 10 years, so get eight. I could do my maths, it’s got to be 80, 70, so it’ll be another generation before anything like what they’re talking about occurs.

Ben: We know it’s never too late to learn a lesson. What would you say to Chris Bowen if he’s listening this morning?

Paul Broad: Oh, take a big deep breath. You’re a minister now, you’ve got responsibilities. You got to put it all on the line and you got to be honest to everybody about it.

Ben: We really appreciate you coming on the line. You haven’t mucked about, you’re pulling no punches this morning, and we appreciate that, Paul.

Paul Broad: Thanks, Ben.

Ben: Paul Broad, the former boss of Snowy 2.0 and I can only imagine the reaction in Chris Bowen’s office right now. They won’t be liking what they’re hearing, but it sounds to me like he’s just given a unfiltered view of Snowy 2.0, and also the transition to renewables. And you heard what he said about the government’s targets, BS. And he didn’t put it the way I just put it then. He’s also weighed into the other issue, which is just so obvious, about needing to keep our major coal plant open. That is something that Chris Minns entertained during the election campaign, and thankfully since winning the election, he suggested that that is a must, that he’s got to work out how we can keep the supply going and keep the prices low. And the discussions are underway with the operators.

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Bogged Snowy 2.0 in a hole lot of trouble

The Snowy 2.0 pumped hydro is one of the biggest disasters in our Government’s history.

Originally budgeted as a $2 billion renewable battery, it’s now estimated it won’t get power to the grid for less than $10 Billion. Despite telling me four months ago that the tunneling machine ‘Florence’ wasn’t bogged (it had “encountered soft ground”) the 7.30 Report tells us in the last 10 months the bogged Florence appears to have tunneled just 150m from its starting point before a 50m hole to the surface appeared on top of it.

All of this for a project to produce the same amount of electricity in a year that the Liddell coal fired power station could make in two weeks.
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PM abandons promise to cut power bills by $275

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While PM Albanese wants electricity-grid wrecking net-zero, he will never be able to deliver his promised $275 cheaper power bills. That’s why he has had to walk away from his first election promise already.

Transcript

As a servant to the people of Queensland and Australia, I support Senator Payne’s matter of public importance. Prime Minister Albanese’s promise to reduce electricity bills by $275 and his promise to reduce carbon dioxide output by 43 per cent are mutually exclusive. High energy prices will reduce energy usage and assist Australia to reach the 43 per cent figure. Lower prices will increase energy consumption, and that will work against the Albanese government’s target. That’s why the Albanese government so quickly ran away from his promise. The Prime Minister never intended to honour the promise, making his action cynical political expediency.

One Nation believes any attempt to implement a 43 per cent carbon dioxide reduction is a policy based on lies and distortions which do not stand up to rigorous scrutiny. Prime Minister Albanese has already signalled, across several issues, his government will be a government based on virtue signalling, not a sensible policy. For senators with no data on their side, the only option is to sell a policy on feelings. Feelings will not keep the lights on, supermarket freezers cold or hospitals open. Feelings will not warm Australians in winter or cool us in summer. Evidence based policy will. Energy deficits in several areas of Australia have already caused blackouts. The 43 per cent target will cause many more blackouts.

Rapidly increasing electricity costs will reduce consumption of electricity and buy the government time, while it asks around for a permanent solution, which is why the government is allowing this to happen. Closing down and sabotaging baseload coal has led to the national electricity racket—sorry market—showing unprecedented wholesale power prices. The average spot price of $264 per megawatt hour last quarter is more than triple the average spot price of $85 per megawatt hour this time last year. Prime Minister Albanese knew this when he made his promise, and clearly economics is not the Prime Minister’s strong suit. If the cost of an item is up 300 per cent, the chances of being able to make it cheaper without the government paying for it are zero.

Perhaps the Prime Minister can extend his employment talkfest to more aspects of government business. Let’s see if anyone knows how to use wind and solar to replace baseload coal and save Australia from electricity and energy Armageddon, because all I’m hearing so far is, ‘Build more wind and solar.’ Building more will simply add more capacity when we don’t need it, during the day, when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing. Solar and wind will need to be paired with some form of battery technology to move that generated electricity from the day, when we don’t need it, to the evening, when we do.

Coal sitting in hoppers ready to generate power on demand is the battery we have used successfully for 120 years. Alternatives to coal are thin on the ground. Battery storage costs are staggering and unsustainable: $1.5 million per megawatt hour. We need around 60,000 megawatt hours of energy in storage to ensure any 24-hour period is not subject to blackouts, yet batteries need 20 per cent above rated capacity to achieve full charge due to heat loss, which is why they catch fire a lot. This means we need 72,000 megawatt-hours of storage, at a cost of $108 billion every 12 years, the life of a big Tesla battery. That is $9 billion every year. The Snowy 2 big hydro battery currently under construction will provide 1,000 megawatt-hours daily for 365 a year at a cost of $5 billion. This means that pumped hydro will cost $300 billion to carry enough power for just one day. Of course, adding electric vehicle charging to the mix means a whole lot more blackouts and a whole lot more electricity price increases.

Net zero is an unaffordable fairy tale that will destroy our standard of living and destroy our lifestyle. We are one community, we are one nation and we know what the hell is needed to get back to affordable, reliable, stable electricity.

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Snowy Hydro 2.0 – The whitest white elephant in Australia

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Despite promises of being one of the world’s largest batteries for only $2 billion dollars, Snowy 2.0 is shaping up to cost over $10 billion and only supply a fraction of promised capacity.

Transcript

As a servant to the people of Queensland and Australia, I speak about the Auditor-General’s performance audit titled, No. 33—Performance audit—Snowy 2.0 governance of early implementation: Snowy Hydro Limited.

Some background for those who may be new to this project: Snowy 2.0 is an extension of the Snowy Hydro project, hence the name. In 2017, Prime Minister Turnbull announced the cost of Snowy 2.0 as $2 billion. This report states that the cost is now $5.1 billion plus billions of other costs, totalling well over $10 billion. The completion date is out to 2025, so we can expect further cost blowouts. The project involves using electricity from unreliable sources like wind and solar to pump water from a lower reservoir, Talbingo Dam, through underground pipes to an upper reservoir, Tantangara Dam. Water is then sent back down to Talbingo Dam, generating electricity on the way. Snowy 2.0 is referred to as a ‘big battery’ because water is stored in the top reservoir until it is needed. The same turbine is either pumping water uphill or generating electricity from the water coming down. The total pipe length is 27 kilometres. Generally, water is pumped up during the day—provided the sun is shining and the wind is blowing. The water is then released down the pipe to generate electricity in the evening peak, when it’s most needed. As the sun does not shine and wind goes quiet at night, pumping water back up the hill overnight, ready for the morning peak, will need coal power. The upper reservoir may hold multiple days worth of water and, at some point, the dam must be refilled, especially as Tantangara Dam is currently only 17 per cent full.

Pumped hydro only works when the dam has water in it. For every megawatt of power generated by water coming down the hill, the turbine needs 1.3 megawatts of power to get the water back up, because of losses. In total, 30 per cent more coal is used in Snowy 2.0. Pumped hydro, put simply, entails generating electricity 2.3 times to be used by consumers once. This is not cheap electricity; it’s actually really expensive electricity. The solar and wind fairy tale needs pumped hydro as a way of storing unreliable wind and power generation, which occurs mostly during the day, and moving that capacity to the evening peek, when unreliable solar and wind can’t provide baseload power.

Maximum generation for Snowy 2.0 is an impressive 2,000 megawatts, but here’s the catch: annual generation is listed in this report as 350,000 megawatt hours. Running at full capacity, Snowy 2.0 will generate electricity for only 175 hours a year. To put that into perspective, my home state of Queensland used 68 million megawatt hours last year. Snowy Hydro will contribute the equivalent of half of one per cent of Queensland’s power each year, one-tenth of one per cent of Australia’s annual generation, at a cost of $5 billion and rising—and that doesn’t include all the costs. This madness will send us broke. There’s a far better way: a 2,000-megawatt coal-fired power station is able to run at 2,000 megawatts 98 per cent of the time, 24/7. Liddell in the Hunter Valley generated nine million megawatts last year.

For less than the cost of this green fairy tale called Snowy 2.0, a coal plant can produce at least 25 times the amount of electricity. That’s why Germany’s Greens coalition government is turning Germany’s coal-fired power stations back on. Shutting ours down when we see what’s happening in the rest of the world is criminal irresponsibility. Prime Minister Albanese is promising reduced electricity prices while at the same time building horribly expensive power generation. The Prime Minister’s agenda will fail, and he will take Australia down with him. Instead, One Nation will build baseload power stations, reduce the cost of electricity, restore grid reliability, restore grid stability, restore Australian manufacturing and restore the income of working Australians.

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