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The Government has refused to confirm whether the former politician who sold out Australia to advance the interests of a foreign regime still has access to Parliament House. Former parliamentarians are automatically entitled to passes which grant them access to the private areas of Parliament House in Canberra.

In the words of ASIO spy chief, Mike Burgess, the former politician that “sold out their country to advance the interests of a foreign regime” could be sitting in an office in Parliament House right now and no one would know.

Instead of treating this concern seriously, the Government’s response to my question on this was laughter.

The Government, or the ASIO Chief, must name this traitor as soon as possible. This cloud over Parliament’s security must be fixed immediately.

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: My question is to the Minister representing the Prime Minister, Senator Gallagher. When will the government name the former Australian politician that ASIO Chief Mike Burgess yesterday referenced as someone who sold out Australia to advance the interests of a foreign regime? 

Senator Gallagher: I thank Senator Roberts for the question, and I note the annual threat assessment that was delivered last night by the director-general of ASIO. We have utmost confidence in our security and intelligence services. The director-general made a comment about this. He was specifically asked about this last night. He said he’d made a deliberate decision not to name the individual, and he provided reasons for this. The government respects his judgement. He has our 100 per cent support. He has the full picture, and he made an informed decision. 

The threat assessment made clear that we need to continue to be vigilant and sober in how we respond to threats, and this is what we are doing. The annual threat assessment is an assessment made by ASIO. It is delivered by the director-general of that organisation. It’s not something that the government authors. It’s a document that is very much the director-general and ASIO’s to do so, and he has all the information available to him. He made a decision about that. If that decision changes, that’s his decision as well. It is not a decision for the government to make. 

Senator ROBERTS: Minister, former parliamentarians, as I understand it, have an automatic pass to enter Parliament House. The former politician who sold out this country could be in this building right now, in a parliamentarian’s office, and the office holder, MP or senator, would have no idea they’re talking to a spy. Why won’t you name the traitor now? 

Senator Gallagher: I think passes to this building are a matter for the Presiding Officers—the rules around that. 

Honourable senators interjecting— 

Senator Gallagher: I think it is, isn’t it? 

An honourable senator: Yes. 

Senator Gallagher: Yes, it is. 

Honourable senators interjecting— 

Senator Gallagher: Well, it is. Sorry, but it’s not a matter that the government is responsible for. In relation to the question you asked, which was about naming an individual, it’s a matter for the director-general of ASIO. If he were to choose to name an individual, that would be a matter for him. As part of his annual threat assessment, he made a decision to raise the issue, I think, and to rightly point to the fact that foreign interference is an issue. It’s an issue that all of us, as members of parliament, need to be aware of— (Time expired) 

The President: Senator Roberts, second supplementary? 

Senator ROBERTS: Minister, you have just put the Presiding Officer in a difficult position. Why is this government afraid to say the c-word and acknowledge the country that is the greatest risk to Australia’s interests and largest perpetrator of foreign interference—China, the Chinese Communist Party? 

Senator Gallagher: I’m not sure of the question really. We talk about China all the time as a government. We’ve been seeking to stabilise the relationship. We’ve been seeking to remove some of the trade bans. But we’ve also been very clear that we must disagree where we do, and, where we can agree, we should reach agreement. But there are things that are in our national interests that we may disagree on, and then we will be upfront about that. We will always act in our country’s national interest. That’s what we’ve done from the first day we were appointed and it’s what we will continue to do. That’s what guides us in relation to our interactions and our work across the world. There are a number of countries that we engage with regularly, but it’s always in our national interest that we do that. 

Media Release

I asked ASIO if they would investigate the origin of COVID, which is now known to be the Wuhan bio-lab and involves illegal USA Dept of Defense research?

The answer was clearly an emphatic NO.

Our head of intelligence has no interest in digging into events that led to COVID and worse still, the deadly COVID response.

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: I just want to come back and follow up on a question from Senator Rennick. In World War II we lost 34,000 troops in addition to 70,000-plus casualties and about 10,000 deaths in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps. We were told by the previous government that it was nonsense, initially, that it came from Wuhan gain-of-function research. We now know that’s the case. In America they set up—you’re probably aware of this far more than I am—a Department of Defense medical countermeasures consortium involving Australia, Canada, the United States and Britain. It was a military operation, and we now know gain-of-function research was the origin of COVID. The number of deaths we’ve now had, around 30,000 to 40,000 deaths, rivals World War II. We know this was a military operation in that military departments from those four countries were involved. Surely it’d be something you’d research.

Mr Burgess: You’re saying it’s something we know. I don’t agree with you on that. I don’t know that, and I’m not taking any further action on the COVID matter.

Senator ROBERTS: It’s killed almost as many people as troops died in World War II.

Mr Burgess: I recognise the impact COVID had on the globe. As for the matter of whether it’s a threat to security and ASIO are investigating it, I can tell you we’re not investigating its origins.

Senator ROBERTS: I want to be clear: COVID didn’t cost those lives; the government’s injections cost those lives. Surely you want to know whether gain-of-function research led to the spike protein also in the injections.

Mr Burgess: I stand by my comments. We’re not investigating it.

This is the second Senate Estimates I have raised questions about Chinese Communist Party contact points (or Chinese overseas police stations) in Australia. We know they exist and that this issue has been investigated and confirmed by mainstream media.

I asked Home Affairs, the department responsible for Australia’s security, why there is a CCP contact point office in Sydney. Home Affairs avoided answering – this from the department responsible for national security policy. What hope have we got? This is the same department that helps META censor accurate social media posts from Australians, yet it won’t discuss CCP activity within Australia.

I was told Home Affairs was not the correct agency to ask these questions and was directed to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). The head of ASIO said he has no knowledge of a contact point in Sydney and referred me to the Australian Federal Police (AFP), who likewise stated that they had no evidence or information of this.

There must be a reason why they refuse to discuss this and are maintaining the secret.

Transcript below.

Transcript below.

Transcripts

Home Affairs

Senator ROBERTS: Yes. Given the general concern about the Chinese Communist Party’s global involvement in overseas affairs, in many countries’ affairs, why is there a Chinese contact point in Sydney? The
contact point is a Chinese Communist Party-staffed office set up in a country outside China.

Mr Smyth: I would refer you to the Department of Foreign Affairs for matters in relation to that?

Senator ROBERTS: Well, you’re in charge of security.

Mr Smyth: I look after policy in relation to issues. But issues that go to bilateral relations with foreign governments or countries or their activities is a responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Senator ROBERTS: I’m after program 1.2, national security and resilience, so I’ll continue.

Senator Watt: With respect, Senator Roberts, you can’t just ask any question that includes those words in it. There are particular departments that are better suited to answering certain questions, and I think DFAT is probably the best department to answer the questions you’ve just asked.

Senator ROBERTS: I would doubt that, Senator Watt, because this is a security issue.

Senator Watt: Sure, but we want to make sure that you get the very best possible answers. You’ve already heard from the officials that DFAT is probably best placed, and they’ll be up on Thursday.

Senator ROBERTS: The AFP deputy commissioner investigations, Reece Kershaw, addressed this matter in a Senate estimates hearing in November 2022. He said that he did not believe the Sydney contact point was active, without going into further detail. So these questions are being asked to update the current situation. Is there still a CCP supported contact point in Sydney? That’s a yes or no answer. It doesn’t need to upset anyone.

CHAIR: Senator Roberts, the AFP will be appearing a little bit later today. If you’ve got questions for them or are following up from answers that they’ve given at previous estimates, they will be available for you to ask those questions then.

Senator ROBERTS: I’m stunned that the Department of Home Affairs cannot face questions about security?

Senator Watt: That’s not a fair way to put it.

Senator ROBERTS: It is true.

Senator Watt: That’s your take on it, Senator Roberts. We’ve tried to assist you by—

Senator ROBERTS: Let the people of Australia decide on what their take is.

Senator Watt: We’ve tried to assist you by telling you the two different groups you could put those questions to. We’re all going to be here all week and there are opportunities for you to ask those questions.

Senator ROBERTS: What’s the role of Home Affairs with regard to national security and resilience? Minister?

Senator Watt: I’ll suggest that the deputy secretary in charge of that area answers your question, Senator Roberts.

Mr Smyth: In relation to resilience, we have a task force that was established in November 2022, and that’s to better position Australia for what we see as a significant set of risks and challenges that it faces across the full spectrum of national and human induced crises. The task force leads on national resilience policy and strategy. That ensures that the Commonwealth has the necessary policy, legislation and capability to manage what is really an increasingly complex and cascading set of concurrent national crises in the current geostrategic and geopolitical environment. We provide advice to government around issues in relation to national security. We look after national security policy. We look after legislation for intelligence services. We look after countering foreign interference policy, terrorism policy et cetera.

Senator ROBERTS: Counter and foreign interference policy—that’s what I’m talking about.

Mr Smyth: And we do that in collaboration with other portfolio agencies.

Senator ROBERTS: I’d like to know your role in that collaboration.

Mr Smyth: My role is as the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator.

Senator ROBERTS: What would be your role in knowing whether or not there’s a CCP-supported contact point in Sydney?

Mr Smyth: I’d have to take that question on notice. I think the evidence that was given to you by Commissioner Kershaw was that that is not an active—

Senator ROBERTS: I’d like to know what it is now.

Ms Foster: I think that the difference perhaps is that Mr Smyth is responsible for the overall policy and coordination, but operational issues will typically fall within the purview of the operational agency which is why the Australian Federal Police is best placed to answer questions about current operations.

Senator ROBERTS: Wonderful! Before you start getting into policy—unlike climate change, where there’s no data, despite driving that policy—what is the purpose of the Chinese Communist Party contact point in Sydney? What is its purpose?

Mr Smyth: I would refer you to the AFP in relation to the evidence that has been previously given by Commissioner Kershaw.

Senator ROBERTS: I want to know what it is now. That was 12 months ago.

Ms Foster: Yes, Senator, and that’s an operational issue, which Senator Kershaw is well placed to answer, and he will be appearing later tonight.

Senator ROBERTS: I want to know what your take on it is, because we’re trusting you with our security.

Ms Foster: I’ve just made a distinction between our role in providing the overall policy framework and coordination and the role of individual operational agencies to manage specific operational issues. I think it’s evident from the fact that the evidence last time came from Commissioner Kershaw that this is an operational issue which the AFP is best placed to deal with.

Senator ROBERTS: What’s your policy for handling the Chinese Communist Party contact points, and what’s the basis of that policy?

Mr Smyth: The issues that relate to that, I think, are best referred to the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce, which is an ASIO and AFP led taskforce that deals with operational matters in relation to foreign interference activity on Australian soil.

Senator ROBERTS: I’ll acknowledge that you’re talking about operations with other people. I want to know what the basis for your policy is in regard to the Chinese Communist Party contact points in Sydney, because initially they weren’t existing and then we find out they do.

Mr Smyth: Where foreign governments seek to interfere in the democratic process of Australia, we take an interest, but those issues relate more to operational matters for taskforce agencies. In relation to the contact point that you’re referring to, I’d have to take on notice any specific information that we have that resides in this portfolio.

Senator ROBERTS: Okay. That’s two questions you’ve taken on notice. Are there Chinese police officers working out of the premises? You can take that on notice. And are—

CHAIR: Senator Roberts!

Mr Smyth: That would be an operational matter for the taskforce members and also a matter potentially for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Ms Foster: Senator, we’re not seeking to be unhelpful. It’s just not helpful to you if we take something on notice which we’re then going to refer to someone else.

Senator ROBERTS: Are there any concerns of the security agencies about potential breaches of Australian national sovereignty?

Ms Foster: That would have to be addressed to the security agencies.

Senator Watt: ASIO will be on later today as well, Senator Roberts. There are opportunities for you to ask these questions. It’s just that they’ve got to go to the people who can answer them.

Senator ROBERTS: I’d would like to know that Home Affairs knows something about this. Should Chinese people living in Australia be concerned? You’re in charge of security.

Mr Smyth: Again, I’ll refer you to previous answers that we’ve given.

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you.

CHAIR: Senator Roberts, are those all the questions you have?

Senator ROBERTS: Thanks, Chair.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr Burgess and your staff, for being here. I asked a question of Home Affairs, and they said to come here and also AFP. Given the general concern about Chinese Communist Party global involvement in overseas affairs, why is there a Chinese contact point in Sydney? A contact point, I’m sure you know, is a Chinese Communist Party staffed office set up in a country outside China.

Mr Burgess: I’m not aware of a Chinese contact point in this country other than the official consulate and embassy presence.

Senator ROBERTS: The Australian Federal Police deputy commissioner of investigations, Reece Kershaw, addressed this matter in a Senate estimates hearing in November 2022. He said he did not believe the Sydney contact point was active, without going into further details. These questions I’m going to ask are to update the current situation. You’re not aware of it, so what is the purpose of a CCP contact point?

Mr Burgess: I can’t comment about the purpose of something I’m not aware of. What I will say is my agency does consider and look for signs of foreign interference, and it’s more the behaviour we’re focused on in terms of anyone in this country that might be here doing something which is against our national interest, represents a threat to security and is not publicly declared.

Senator ROBERTS: Would it be something you’d investigate if it wasn’t a threat necessarily to Australian security but a threat to the security of Chinese citizens or former Chinese citizens?

Mr Burgess: Anyone in this country gets our protection.

Senator ROBERTS: Good. As I said, Reece Kershaw addressed the matter and said he didn’t believe it was active, without going into further detail. You can’t tell me how long it’s been in operation? You can’t tell me, a year later, whether there are Chinese police officers working out of the premises?

Mr Burgess: I would stand by my judgement that there is not a Chinese contact point in this country.

Senator ROBERTS: Are there concerns at the security agencies about potential breaches of Australian national sovereignty?

Mr Burgess: Every day in my line of business.

Senator ROBERTS: Do you surveil any threats from the CCP in this country that could affect Chinese residents or Taiwanese residents?

Mr Burgess: I do not talk about operational matters publicly.

Australian Federal Police

CHAIR: Thanks, Senator Scarr. Against my better judgement, Senator Roberts has got two minutes. That probably equates to two questions, and we thank you for your brevity.

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you for appearing tonight. The 60 Minutes program broadcast on 18 June this year—an investigative story—showed interviews with several Australian citizens who had been intimidated by Chinese authorities and showed proof of the existence of at least one Chinese overseas police station in suburban Sydney. What actions have been taken by the AFP with whom the information was shared?

Mr McCartney: I think we’ve been asked this question a number of times during past Senate estimates and I think we’ve been consistent. In terms of the construct of a Chinese police station operating in Australia, I also heard the Director-General of ASIO state today that we’ve got no evidence or information on that. But, having said that, is Chinese foreign interference a threat? Yes, it is, and we continue to work very proactively with ASIO and other agencies in relation to that space.

Senator ROBERTS: This is my last question. The Australian Federal Police deputy commissioner of investigations, Reece Kershaw, addressed this matter in Senate estimates hearings in November 2022, I
understand. He said he did not believe the Sydney contact point was active, without going into further detail. These questions are asked to update the current situation.

Mr Kershaw: Senator, I’m the Commissioner of the AFP. I think you called me ‘deputy’. You’ve demoted me!

Senator ROBERTS: I have a lot of respect for the AFP; believe me. And I’m pleased you can see it with a sense of humour.

Mr Kershaw: So what was the end of a question?

Senator ROBERTS: Reece Kershaw said that the Sydney contact point was active, without going into further detail. I was going to ask more questions.

Mr McCartney: Senator, I think it was actually me who said that at the last Senate estimates. I would go back to my first answer: there’s no information that indicates that a Chinese police station is operating in Sydney, and that’s a position that’s supported by ASIO.

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you very much, Chair.

CHAIR: Thanks, Senator Roberts. We appreciate you keeping to your word. That’s all the questions we have for the Australian Federal Police. Thank you, Commissioner.