During a session with CSIRO at Senate Estimates, I raised serious questions about Australia’s pandemic preparedness and biosecurity.
The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza took a decade to develop, yet it was shelved during COVID. I asked CSIRO whether this plan is being updated and what lessons have been learned.
I also pressed CSIRO on their handling of live viruses—rabies, Ebola, and others—and sought assurances that Australia’s highest-security facility will never repeat the mistakes of Wuhan. CSIRO advised of their world-class biocontainment standards and of their 40-year record without a breach.
Finally, I asked Professor Sutton about his recent comments suggesting future pandemic responses could avoid harsh lockdowns. His view: policy decisions should be “less restrictive” than what we saw during COVID.
Australians deserve transparency and accountability on pandemic planning. I’ll keep asking the tough questions.
— Senate Estimates | October 2025
Transcript
Senator ROBERTS: My questions now go to pandemic preparedness. This is the Australian—
Senator Ayres: We’re off the horses and ferrets now, Senator Roberts?
Senator ROBERTS: Yes, and the rats and the birds.
CHAIR: Senator Roberts, you’ve got three minutes.
Senator Ayres: We’re now going to move on to the main event.
Senator ROBERTS: The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza was developed over 10 years, concluding in 2019, just in time for COVID. But it wasn’t used; it was binned. As your department is pandemic preparedness, Professor Sutton, are you working on updating this plan and correcting whatever reason caused it not to be used?
Dr Hilton: Again, Professor Sutton is not responsible for the ACDP, which is our centre for pandemic preparedness. Professor Sutton is responsible for our research unit, named health and biosecurity.
Senator ROBERTS: Does the CSIRO handle live viruses? Your achievement page mentions lyssavirus— including rabies and Ebola, for example. If you have live viruses, which ones do you have?
Dr Hilton: So are we back to horses and weasels and ferrets?
Senator ROBERTS: Just viruses.
Dr Hilton: Yes; we hold a number of—
Senator ROBERTS: I treat this pretty seriously.
Dr Hilton: So do I.
Senator Ayres: I’m trying, Senator.
Dr Hilton: I just want to make sure we’re going back to your first line of questions.
Senator ROBERTS: I’m just going through whether or not you handle live viruses.
Dr Hilton: I think we’ve established that. We do handle live viruses.
Senator ROBERTS: Thank you. Can you assure the committee that CSIRO will not slip up in the way the Wuhan Institute of Virology did in the escape of their Frankenstein COVID experiment?
Dr Hilton: I would not characterise it in that way. CSIRO takes its responsibility for biosecurity exceptionally seriously in all of its facilities and works closely with regulators to ensure that it maintains the highest standards.
Senator ROBERTS: So you can give me an assurance it won’t escape?
Dr Hilton: What won’t escape?
Senator ROBERTS: Live viruses.
Dr Hilton: Any live viruses? I will give you assurance that we work assiduously to maintain the highest standards of biosecurity as an organisation, across our sites.
Senator ROBERTS: Highest standards—can you give me an assurance that they won’t escape?
Dr Hilton: Senator, we maintain our facility to the highest standards of biosecurity.
Senator ROBERTS: Can you give me an assurance it won’t escape?
Dr Taylor: Senator, I can add that the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness is one of three facilities in the world that has the highest biocontainment. It is quite unique in its capabilities. Its box-in-a-box design means that, even if the facility fails and if electricity fails, there are triple redundancies in the system. It is world renowned for its secure capabilities. That is why we handle high consequence live viruses there, and that’s its purpose. It’s done that for 40 years without a biosecurity breach.
Senator ROBERTS: Obviously you won’t give me an ironclad guarantee, but that’s fine. In Professor Sutton’s podcast interview, conducted recently, he made the statement that the government could consider not introducing the intrusive COVID social restrictions—lockdowns for instance. Is his opinion based on the work you have done at CSIRO or could you expand on what aspects of the social restrictions should be reconsidered? If Professor Sutton can’t answer it, perhaps you could do it.
Dr Hilton: I think that would be one that Professor Sutton could shed light on—to the interview.
Senator Ayres: He’s been champing at the bit to respond!
Prof. Sutton: That reflection was really based on the fact that it’s a matter for future governments as to the policy settings in response to any future pandemic. It’s not for me to say what the settings could be, but I could certainly imagine a future in which policy decisions could be less restrictive than we’ve experienced historically.
Senator ROBERTS: Thank you very much. See, that wasn’t so difficult.
Prof. Sutton: Not at all.
Dr Hilton: It was a pleasure.
CHAIR: Thank you for your rapid-fire approach, Senator Roberts.

