Posts

During this Estimates session, I raised questions regarding the management of Lyme Disease. Unfortunately, my concerns appeared to fall on deaf ears. I was repeatedly told the same narrative—that there is no evidence of Lyme Disease existing in Australia—and it was evident that the so-called “experts” had no interest in exploring this issue further.

There was no substantive response to my request for a comprehensive epidemiological study to be done on tick-borne diseases, nor was there any acknowledgment given of the many individuals living with poorly diagnosed and inadequately treated tick-related illnesses.

The remainder of my questions will be submitted on notice, with the hope of receiving detailed and meaningful responses.

— Senate Estimates | December 2025

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: I’d like to build on questions from earlier tonight and turn to Lyme disease. For several decades, the risk of harm from tick-borne diseases has been recorded, published, reported and presented to the department of health and the ministers’ offices and advisers at the time. Some of this has even been done through the government’s own infectious disease bulletins. Doctors are verifying Lyme disease—we’ve heard that anecdotally—in Australia. I’m going to talk later about epidemiological studies and records that the department has. In the meantime, could you please specify the dates and events when evidence of the harm of tick-borne diseases has been presented to the department and the actions that have been undertaken to protect Australians historically. You can take it on notice if you like.

Ms Quilty: We’ll take that on notice.

Senator ROBERTS: I acknowledge that in 2016 and 2025 we had very limited Senate inquiries into Lyme disease and tick-borne diseases. The terms of reference were very vague and the recommendations were vague. I’m going to ask about the implementation. But at least the term ‘tick-borne diseases’ was recognised. We still don’t know the full extent and the nature of the entire tick-borne disease problem. Why haven’t these tick-borne disease infections been quantified with a study of the population in the form of a human epidemiological study? There are a lot of people suffering.

Senator Green: We’ve answered quite a lot of these questions before.

Senator ROBERTS: Not these exact—

Senator Green: No, but a study has been done. Anyway, I’ll let the officials answer. We’re just going back over—

Senator ROBERTS: Has an epidemiological study been done?

Senator Green: Not one of those types, but—

Ms Quilty: I’m happy to be corrected, but we’ll take that on notice.

Senator ROBERTS: As far as you know, no studies have been done epidemiologically.

Ms Quilty: Not that I’m aware of.

Senator ROBERTS: Why is the Public Health Laboratory Network’s own diagnosis data being ignored with these diseases when they hold the results of thousands of test results for tickborne disease?

Mr Martin: I’m not aware of the data you refer to being withheld. Some of the tickborne diseases are notifiable, and we do collect information on those. I think one of the challenges is that there are a range of conditions which patients believe may be caused by ticks but, as I’ve mentioned in an earlier answer, there’s not necessarily evidence that the pathogen that would cause that disease is present in Australia. I think that it’s challenging to collect information where we don’t have that causal pathway—

Senator ROBERTS: Have you been given or have you collected samples?

Mr Martin: Samples of?

Senator ROBERTS: Infection.

Mr Martin: There are established diagnostic tests for different tickborne diseases.

Mr Comley: I think the evidence that was tendered earlier was that the bacteria that cause the Lyme disease have not been detected in Australia. It’s not that there aren’t people who contract it overseas and come here. There is also evidence that there are other tickborne diseases that are present in Australia, but not Lyme disease—for the bacteria that’s required to be the cause of the disease.

Senator ROBERTS: I’ll say it again: I don’t understand the exact health system, but why is the Public Health Laboratory Network’s own diagnosis data being ignored with these diseases when they hold the results for thousands of tests for tickborne disease? Why is that being an ignored? What’s been done with it? What’s going to be done with it?

Mr Comley: I think we’re struggling to describe which laboratories you are talking about. Can you provide evidence of that. We’re happy to take on notice whether there is any evidence of that effect in Australia. I think the evidence tendered earlier in this estimate session was that there wasn’t such evidence in Australia, but we’re happy to take that on notice.

Senator ROBERTS: I’m told that there is evidence held by the Public Laboratory Network’s own data.

Mr Comley: We’ll take that on notice, unless the CMO would like to comment.

Prof. Kidd: Senator, there is evidence of tickborne infectious diseases that people have contracted in Australia. There are a number of those infections which are recorded, for which people are tested: some of the Rickettsial infections, Queensland tick typhus, Flinders Island spotted fever, Australian spotted fever, Q fever—due to Coxiella burnetii. There’s data on each of these particular tickborne diseases, which will be in our laboratory systems and which are brought together. The issue about Lyme disease—we’ve talked about that before.

Senator ROBERTS: I am told that hospitals have discharge records, with some stating tickborne illness, Lyme disease, Babesia, rickets, Bartonella et cetera, yet accurate and reliable testing for all these diseases in Australia does not occur. Are you able to provide a quantification of this? This is a public health threat.

Prof. Kidd: I think we’ll need to take that on notice from the PHLN.

Senator ROBERTS: I understand. Why can’t the study of this data for all vector-borne diseases—as part of the responsibility of the Department of Health from the 2016 Senate inquiry—be done to complete an epidemiological study? Can you take that on notice?

Ms Quilty: Yes, we have.

Mr Martin: We can. I think it might take me a moment to find it, but I think the government’s response to the most recent inquiry—

Senator ROBERTS: It’s very vague.

Mr Martin: It does go into the feasibility of—it is not feasible, necessarily, to collect data on everyone who may have been bitten by a tick in Australia. We do have a system around notifiable diseases, where that is nationally collected and reported upon for particular pathogens. I can take it on notice and provide further information on some of those practicalities.

Senator ROBERTS: We’ve got readily available tickborne disease testing panels in Australia for livestock and domestic animals, especially for exports, I’m told. We don’t want to hurt people overseas. Veterinarians know that sometimes it’s necessary for animals that are sick with tickborne disease to be put down. The question raised is: are we doing nothing about humans? Are we going to start putting humans down? That’s pretty far-fetched, of course, but I’m saying that there are lots and lots of people who are sick and crippled a bit and nothing seems to be done.

Senator Green: I understand, but perhaps you could put a question to the officials that they can answer for you.

Senator ROBERTS: On my frustration.

Senator Green: You can express your frustration in the Senate chamber next year.

Senator ROBERTS: I don’t have Lyme disease, but I know people who have, and I know people who’ve got tickborne diseases, and there’s been no epidemiological study done. This has been going on for decades.

Senator Green: I understand. There have been inquiries, responses to those inquiries and the officials have answered your questions.

Senator ROBERTS: I know you, Senator Green. You would not be proud of the studies that have been done in the 2016 Senate inquiry.

Senator Green: I’m very aware of the inquiries. I know that a lot of good senators from this place have been involved in those inquiries and have taken evidence from people who are affected, and the government’s responded to those inquiries.

Senator ROBERTS: I say again: why can’t the study of this data for all vector-borne diseases be part of the responsibility of the department of health and be done to complete an epidemiological study? You’ve taken that on notice.

Senator Green: We’ve taken that on notice.

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you. I’m early this time.

CHAIR: You are early this time. I’m very grateful for that. Senator Liddle.

At Estimates, I asked Professor Adriana Platona why the Australian Government and CSL took the unacceptable risk of allowing its haemophilia patients to receive a product that would likely infect them with Hepatitis C – as it later became known as. That question was left unanswered.

I asked why, even after safer 80-degree heat-treated products were available in the UK from 1985 for both Factor VIII and Factor IX, Australia continued to allow hepatitis-infected factor concentrates to be used—until 1990 for Factor VIII and 1993 for Factor IX. That question, along with five others, was taken on notice.

I made it clear: a Royal Commission is warranted. The government has failed to deliver justice to victims, unlike the toothless 2004 inquiry that achieved nothing.

Victims of this scandal deserve answers. They deserve to know why they were infected.

— Senate Estimates | December 2025

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: I’ll start with the National Blood Authority and tainted blood. These questions are from constituents. In the UK, from 1985, factor concentrates began to be heat-treated at 80 degrees for 72 hours. That’s in Britain. Australia, though, chose to go with an alternative heat treatment method of 60 degrees for 72 hours, which at the time was considered to be a method to inactivate HIV, although it was noted that it was not likely that the 60-degree method of heat treatment would inactivate Non-A, Non-B hepatitis, which came to be known as hepatitis C. Why did the Australian government and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories take the unacceptable risk of allowing its haemophilia patients to receive a product that would likely infect them with Non-A, Non-B hepatitis—hepatitis C?

Professor Platona: Thank you, Senator, for your question. Australia has one of the safest blood systems in the world, and the testing for hepatitis C and HIV was introduced in Australia much sooner than it was in the UK. So the situation between Australia and the UK is not comparable. In 2004, there was an extensive inquiry into hepatitis C and the blood supply in Australia. Many of the questions that you have raised were discussed extensively around April 2004. People have provided submissions, testimonials. There was an extensive inquiry at the time. Many of these issues were discussed extensively at the time.

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you, Professor. We’ll get to those points in a minute. Why did the Australian government and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories—by the way, you didn’t answer my question as to why the Australian government and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories took the unacceptable risk of allowing its haemophilic patients to receive a product that would likely infect them. So I’ll move on to the second question. Why did the Australian government and the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories—and these questions, by the way, are from people who have had their lives damaged seriously—continue to allow patients to receive hepatitis infected factor concentrates, all the way up until 1990 for factor 8 and, unbelievably, 1993 for factor 9, when the UK were receiving the safer 80-degree treated product for both factor 8 and factor 9 concentrates since 1985? So we were five years behind and eight years behind.

Professor Platona: That is not my understanding of the fact. I would be very happy to check those facts for you and provide that on notice, with reference to the material submitted in 2004.

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you. I’ve got five questions on notice in the interest of speed. Minister, these questions relate to events that occurred long ago—I acknowledge that—yet they still impact and kill victims today. There are people with their lives damaged seriously. That’s precisely why we need a royal commission into what occurred. The government cannot produce the answers that the victims deserve. These people are deeply upset, deservedly so—not deservedly so, but rightly so. We need a thorough investigation where people are compelled to give evidence and answer questions under oath, unlike the 2004 Senate inquiry which has been described as a toothless inquiry by prominent lawyer Des Collins, who was heavily involved in the UK infected blood inquiry. We don’t accept the 2004 Senate inquiry. Minister, don’t you think the victims of this scandal deserve answers as to what occurred and why they were infected?

Senator Green: I don’t think that’s an appropriate question that I can answer for you other than to say that the constituents’ issues that you raise continually in this committee are valid and that the officials have provided you, I think, very reasonable and factual advice. I don’t have any information that I can give you other than what the officials have given you. You’re very entitled to come here and advocate for your constituents and their concerns, but I don’t have any other advice I can give you.

During a session with CSIRO at Senate Estimates, I raised serious questions about Australia’s pandemic preparedness and biosecurity.

The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza took a decade to develop, yet it was shelved during COVID. I asked CSIRO whether this plan is being updated and what lessons have been learned.

I also pressed CSIRO on their handling of live viruses—rabies, Ebola, and others—and sought assurances that Australia’s highest-security facility will never repeat the mistakes of Wuhan. CSIRO advised of their world-class biocontainment standards and of their 40-year record without a breach.

Finally, I asked Professor Sutton about his recent comments suggesting future pandemic responses could avoid harsh lockdowns. His view: policy decisions should be “less restrictive” than what we saw during COVID.

Australians deserve transparency and accountability on pandemic planning. I’ll keep asking the tough questions.

— Senate Estimates | October 2025

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: My questions now go to pandemic preparedness. This is the Australian—   

Senator Ayres: We’re off the horses and ferrets now, Senator Roberts?   

Senator ROBERTS: Yes, and the rats and the birds.   

CHAIR: Senator Roberts, you’ve got three minutes.   

Senator Ayres: We’re now going to move on to the main event.   

Senator ROBERTS: The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza was developed over 10 years, concluding in 2019, just in time for COVID. But it wasn’t used; it was binned. As your department is pandemic preparedness, Professor Sutton, are you working on updating this plan and correcting whatever reason caused it not to be used?   

Dr Hilton: Again, Professor Sutton is not responsible for the ACDP, which is our centre for pandemic preparedness. Professor Sutton is responsible for our research unit, named health and biosecurity.   

Senator ROBERTS: Does the CSIRO handle live viruses? Your achievement page mentions lyssavirus— including rabies and Ebola, for example. If you have live viruses, which ones do you have?   

Dr Hilton: So are we back to horses and weasels and ferrets?   

Senator ROBERTS: Just viruses.   

Dr Hilton: Yes; we hold a number of—   

Senator ROBERTS: I treat this pretty seriously.   

Dr Hilton: So do I.   

Senator Ayres: I’m trying, Senator.   

Dr Hilton: I just want to make sure we’re going back to your first line of questions.   

Senator ROBERTS: I’m just going through whether or not you handle live viruses.   

Dr Hilton: I think we’ve established that. We do handle live viruses.   

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you. Can you assure the committee that CSIRO will not slip up in the way the Wuhan Institute of Virology did in the escape of their Frankenstein COVID experiment?   

Dr Hilton: I would not characterise it in that way. CSIRO takes its responsibility for biosecurity exceptionally seriously in all of its facilities and works closely with regulators to ensure that it maintains the highest standards.   

Senator ROBERTS: So you can give me an assurance it won’t escape?   

Dr Hilton: What won’t escape?   

Senator ROBERTS: Live viruses.   

Dr Hilton: Any live viruses? I will give you assurance that we work assiduously to maintain the highest standards of biosecurity as an organisation, across our sites.   

Senator ROBERTS: Highest standards—can you give me an assurance that they won’t escape?   

Dr Hilton: Senator, we maintain our facility to the highest standards of biosecurity.   

Senator ROBERTS: Can you give me an assurance it won’t escape?   

Dr Taylor: Senator, I can add that the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness is one of three facilities in the world that has the highest biocontainment. It is quite unique in its capabilities. Its box-in-a-box design means that, even if the facility fails and if electricity fails, there are triple redundancies in the system. It is world renowned for its secure capabilities. That is why we handle high consequence live viruses there, and that’s its purpose. It’s done that for 40 years without a biosecurity breach.   

Senator ROBERTS: Obviously you won’t give me an ironclad guarantee, but that’s fine. In Professor Sutton’s podcast interview, conducted recently, he made the statement that the government could consider not introducing the intrusive COVID social restrictions—lockdowns for instance. Is his opinion based on the work you have done at CSIRO or could you expand on what aspects of the social restrictions should be reconsidered? If Professor Sutton can’t answer it, perhaps you could do it.   

Dr Hilton: I think that would be one that Professor Sutton could shed light on—to the interview.   

Senator Ayres: He’s been champing at the bit to respond!   

Prof. Sutton: That reflection was really based on the fact that it’s a matter for future governments as to the policy settings in response to any future pandemic. It’s not for me to say what the settings could be, but I could certainly imagine a future in which policy decisions could be less restrictive than we’ve experienced historically.   

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you very much. See, that wasn’t so difficult.   

Prof. Sutton: Not at all.   

Dr Hilton: It was a pleasure.   

CHAIR: Thank you for your rapid-fire approach, Senator Roberts.  

I spoke with the CEO of the National Blood Authority, Adjunct Professor Ms Adriana Platona. She confirmed that the Australian Government owned the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories before it was privatised. She also stated that the National Blood Authority was established in 2003.

I asked her what steps had been taken to ensure the safety of concentrates containing Factor VIII. I did not receive a satisfactory answer—rather, I was given an attempted history lesson. Ms Platona went on to explain that the National Blood Authority was created as a result of the negative issues experienced by recipients of blood products during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. She said that an apology had been issued. I question whether an apology alone is enough to compensate victims who were infected with Hepatitis C and HIV?

Ms Platona stated that there have been no contaminated blood incidents since 2003. I suggested that the Commonwealth Government surely had legacy responsibilities, at which point the Deputy Secretary of the Department, Ms Penny Shakespeare, intervened. She said that these issues were primarily the responsibility of the States and Territories. I pointed out that in March 1953 the WHO recommended that dried plasma should be taken from small pools of 10–20 donors only, for safety reasons. Apparently, by the mid-1980s in Australia, plasma was mass-pooled from large numbers of donors, contrary to WHO recommendations. I asked why this had occurred – which had to be taken on notice.

I then asked whether it was considered an acceptable risk—of high probability—that haemophiliacs would contract Hepatitis Non-A, Non-B, and Hepatitis C during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Again, I did not receive a satisfactory. I asked whether adequate compensation would be paid to the victims, as has happened in the UK, but was dismissed, and then my session was cut short by the Chair.

I will continue to seek justice for the victims of this terrible blunder by the Commonwealth and their continued denial of responsibility.

— Senate Estimates | October 2025

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: I’ve got several issues here that I’d like to discuss—National Blood Authority about tainted blood, the pelvic mesh, the Lyme disease, ATAGI following on from Professor Lawler’s comments. So I’ll start with National Blood Authority, please. Is Dr John Rowell here? No. A lot of people are plagued with tainted blood, a heavy burden. At CSL’s 2024 annual general meeting, Chair Brian McNamee stated that, prior to its privatisation, the Australian government was the owner, funder and regulator of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories. Is that correct?  

Prof. Platona: The National Blood Authority was formed in 2003 as a statutory legislative agency. I’m very happy to answer questions about the National Blood Authority’s role and work since 2003.  

Senator ROBERTS: I’m wanting to know if you could confirm that before the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories was sold off to the public, the Australian government was the owner, funder and regulator of the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories.  

Prof. Platona: I believe that is correct, sir.  

Senator ROBERTS: What steps did the Australian government take to regulate the safety of the Factor VIII and IX concentrates manufactured by the Commonwealth Serum Laboratories in the seventies, eighties and nineties?  

Prof. Platona: As I said in the first statement, the National Blood Authority was formed in 2003. I’m happy to answer questions about the work of the agency since then. You are referring to matters that precede the formation of the National Blood Authority by several decades.  

Senator ROBERTS: Could you tell me—I know it was a long time ago, but a lot of people are severely suffering now. Whose responsibility was it at the time, Ms Platona—is it Professor?—  

Prof. Platona: Yes. Ms Platona is fine.  

Senator ROBERTS: to ensure the safety of the Factor VIII and XI concentrates? This has relevance to what you’re doing now.  

Prof. Platona: Indeed. The National Blood Authority was formed, as I said, as a result of some negatively affected people in the seventies, eighties and nineties. My predecessor provided a lot of context in response to your question in November 2024 on Hansard, as to the steps that led to the formation of the National Blood Authority, the apology, the formation of what is now the national Red Cross Lifeblood organisation, the apology that Red Cross Lifeblood made in 2014, and a number of actions by state and territory governments to deal with, really, the failings of the blood transfusion in the past. I do not want you to think at all that I don’t think about the lives of the people that Haemophilia Foundation, for example, is working to support—not at all. I’m the officer that has got the Public Service Medal for making the direct antiviral medicines available. Those hepatitis C treatments are now considered to be best practice and curative. So I do want to acknowledge the hard circumstances of the people affected by the disease.  

Senator ROBERTS: That’s good. Did you want to say any more on that?  

Prof. Platona: I’m keen to do a good job, Senator.  

Senator ROBERTS: How can you do a good job for people with tainted blood? It was the government’s responsibility.  

Prof. Platona: Since the organisation was formed in 2003, to date there has been no contaminated blood incident.  

Senator ROBERTS: Do you not have any legacy responsibilities from your predecessors? The Commonwealth government is responsible.  

Ms Shakespeare: Prior to 1991, the Commonwealth’s role was largely through providing funding to state and territory governments to operate blood services. States and territories regulated the blood supply system in Australia until, as Ms Platona has explained, the National Blood Authority was established in 2003, and it now provides that national coordination. I think we also had the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989. After that, there were changes to the way that blood was regulated as well. Before that, the regulation largely would have been occurring through state and territory governments.  

Senator ROBERTS: But it was overseen by the Commonwealth. Let’s go through the history, and correct me if I’m wrong, Ms Shakespeare. In March 1953, the World Health Organization released a report that recommended dried plasma should be prepared from small pools of no more than 10 to 20 donors. This was ignored, and, by the mid-1980s, factor concentrates were being manufactured using mass pooled plasma from thousands of donors, significantly increasing the risk of hepatitis and HIV. Why were these early recommendations ignored? You weren’t around then, but that was a federal responsibility.  

Ms Shakespeare: We can try and take on notice if there’s anything in the archives about what happened in the 1950s, but it is a little bit difficult for us to talk to you about what happened at that time.  

Senator ROBERTS: Could you take these on notice then, please. It was in the mid 1980s. Factor concentrates were being manufactured using mass pooled plasma from thousands of donors, which went against the prevailing wisdom. Could you find out, Ms Shakespeare—and I thank you for your attention—if it was considered an acceptable risk that there was a high probability of haemophiliacs using factor concentrates that would be infected with hepatitis Non-A, hepatitis Non-B, hepatitis C in the seventies, eighties and nineties?  

Ms Shakespeare: Senator, what I can tell you is that the first specific test for hepatitis C became available in late 1989. Australia was one of the first countries to commence using the test, in November 1989, with implementation completed by February 1990. Similarly, we were one of the first countries to introduce HIV patient screening in May 1985. When tests have become available to make sure that the blood supply was safe and could be monitored for those particular medical issues, we’ve implemented that as early as possible.  

Senator ROBERTS: I’m wondering how to help these people.  

Ms Shakespeare: I think Ms Platona has spoken about some of the assistance that has been provided, and I can go through some of the help that has been provided. There was a review of the blood arrangements in 2001 that was conducted by a former High Court judge. The recommendations from that review were provided to all Australian Health Ministers and led to the establishment of the National Blood Authority and the centralised coordinated arrangements we have to ensure a safe and adequate blood supply that we still have today. We have haemovigilance—  

Senator ROBERTS: Can I interrupt?  

Ms Shakespeare: Of course.  

Senator ROBERTS: That would assume that, prior to that, the blood wasn’t considered to be safe.  

Ms Shakespeare: Decisions will have been made based on the state and territory governments’ delivery of blood products about the introduction of testing when it became available, when those tests were developed. As I said, compared to other countries, Australia was one of the first adopters and introduced those tests at a very early stage. But we didn’t just stop there. We’ve been establishing arrangements to make sure that the blood products that we provide to people today are nationally coordinated, that we’ve got consistent arrangements and that we don’t have differences between regulation and provision in different states and territories. The national haemovigilance program for Australia has been developed. That’s a set of surveillance procedures covering the entire blood transfusion chain, from donation and processing of blood to their provision and transfusion to patients. We have monitoring, reporting, investigating and analysing of adverse events related to donation processing and transfusion, and development and implementation of recommendations to prevent the occurrence or reoccurrence of adverse events. So we’ve got a whole haemovigilance program that now operates that’s been developed and implemented through the National Blood Arrangements. For people that have acquired hepatitis C the direct-acting antivirals, which were listed on the PBS in 2016—at that time that was the largest single PBS listing that had ever been made. We have future-generation directantivirals that are now provided through the PBS. If I can give an example, in 2023-24, we had 9,167 scripts of a drug called glecaprevir and pibrentasvir, which is a current-generation treatment for hepatitis C at a cost to government of $161 million. In the same year, sofosbuvir and velpatasvir, another medicine to treat people with hepatitis C, had 10,953 scripts at a cost to government of $131 million. So we’re providing access to those treatments. Now that covers anybody with hepatitis C. It doesn’t matter how they acquired it, but it would certainly benefit those who acquired it through the blood system before the testing was available.  

Senator ROBERTS: For some of these people with tainted blood, their lives have been really shot. Perhaps you could look at the camera—and I’m not trying to put pressure on you, or Ms Platona, or the minister, but what do we do for these people? Where do they go for compensation? Britain compensated their people with tainted blood, long, long, long ago; they admitted it and got on with the job. How do these people recover? How do these people get compensation if they can’t? I know you’ve given a list of drugs. What do we do?  

Ms Shakespeare: Those are curative, in many cases, direct-acting antivirals, which will be of significant benefit to people with hepatitis C. I should also say that the Australian government contributes to the hepatitis C litigation settlement schemes, which were set up and are managed by the state governments for people that were infected through the blood supply system before we had the National Blood Authority established. That offers financial settlements for people who contracted hepatitis C between 1985 and 1991. So there has been compensation made available and the Australian government contributes to that.  

CHAIR: Senator Roberts, I’m going to have to share the call. We are tight on time.  

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you for your interest, Ms Shakespeare.  

Ms Shakespeare: You’re welcome. 

The Labor Government is running scared of scrutiny. Their atrocious bill to establish an Australian Centre for Disease Control (CDC) is significant legislation—and I’ll go so far as to say it’s the worst I’ve seen in my nine years in the Senate. It’s dangerous.

There were countless amendments that required answers, and many speakers were denied the opportunity to contribute. Serious questions remain unresolved.

The Albanese Government manipulated the speaking list to push One Nation Senators to the bottom. Just before it was my turn to speak, Labor guillotined the bill, preventing any further speeches from being delivered. I managed to use the debate on the guillotine to deliver part of my speech, which is the video you see here.

This marks a new low for the unscrupulous and arrogant Labor Government. The Greens should be ashamed for supporting the guillotine on such an important bill.

The CDC will provide the government of the day with cover to do whatever it wants. It’s expensive, it will control dangerous research, and the reporting and scrutiny provided in this bill are virtually non-existent. This is unacceptable.

One Nation will repeal this bill.

Transcript

Yet again, a guillotine stops debate immediately before I was scheduled to speak against this bill, and after pushing all three One Nation senators, who were going to speak, to the bottom of the list. One Nation opposed the guillotine. We want to know why the coalition and the Greens join with Labor in supporting big pharma.  

Senator Canavan interjecting— 

Senator ROBERTS: Except Senator Canavan. Thank you, Senator Canavan. This is significant legislation, and I’ll go so far as to say that it’s the worst legislation I’ve seen in nine years in the Senate. It’s dangerous. There are many, many amendments that need answers, and there are many speakers that missed out. There are many questions.  

The first question I have for you is: why are you avoiding scrutiny? This is half a bill! The bill establishes what the CDC director can do. It does not, though, establish what the director cannot do. There’s nothing in this legislation to establish rules around the following, so can you please clarify. What is the process for determining where the CDC will be located and what the site features should be—what protections for the community? What research will be conducted at the CDC, if any? Will that research include gain-of-function research, which was the cause of the COVID outbreak in 2019, which killed millions of people? Who will own the taxpayer funded CDC research? There are no answers to these questions. These are fundamental. What research will be conducted in cooperation with research facilities overseas, and what countries should be excluded on national security grounds? Start with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and exclude Anthony Fauci’s haunts, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and America’s National Institutes of Health, and Fauci’s colleagues including Ralph Baric and Peter Daszak. 

Will live animal testing be conducted, and, if so, on what animals and how? Will research be conducted on behalf of commercial corporations, and, if so, who owns the taxpayer funded research. What annual reporting will be produced to alert the parliament and the Australian people about the risks to which they’re being exposed? If the CDC facility handles sensitive material, what level of containment will be used, and what will be the process for investigating and rectifying breaches? And what is the purpose of and limit to research? Is it just ego—’Look at what we can do!’—or is there a genuine medical outcome they’re working towards? 

We know the CSIRO at its Geelong facility is already conducting risky experiments on deadly viruses such as Ebola, and they’re experimenting on animals. Those are my questions. Additionally, what’s happening with taxpayer funds? We know the CSIRO monetises its research, or used to, and we know lately the CSIRO has been publishing the results of their research allowing corporations to piggyback off that research free of charge, saving them years in developing new drugs from which the Australian taxpayers will have no commercial benefit. The taxpayers pay and get no benefit. This is the state of medical research in Australia. What impact will the CDC have on the CSIRO? We don’t know. The bill doesn’t set out these matters. It’s a glaring omission. 

The minister says the Australian CDC will undertake technical and advisory functions based on its public health expertise and knowledge and access to relevant information. What expertise? It hasn’t started yet. You’re assuming bureaucrats and health officials actually have the expertise and knowledge to perform these studies, yet there’s nothing in this bill to say they must have that knowledge—nothing. This is a pretence to give ‘thank you’ jobs to COVID era health officials who have a track record of very dangerous, dishonest and inhuman decisions. These bureaucrats will be given powers. The Chief Medical Officer, for example, must be a doctor, but the director of the CDC does not. What could possibly go wrong? 

Continuing cover ups from the government and freedom of information—an issue which One Nation senator for Western Australia Senator Whitten has raised is the changes the bill makes to the Freedom of Information Act. The bill amends the Freedom of Information Act 1982 to exempt the CDC from freedom of information applications to which the same documents are currently open. I wonder if this is to cover up information from the COVID years or just to get ahead of the next lab leak. 

Finally, I’ve already discussed sensitive biological agents with regard to Ebola. The CDC bill transfers responsibility for the Security Sensitive Biological Agents Regulatory Scheme from the department to the Australian CDC. This scheme regulates certain biological agents that are considered dangerous. Now, let’s take a closer look at this one. Who would decide if a biological agent is sensitive and subject to extra checks? The CDC. Who would be most likely to be importing sensitive biological agents like Ebola and heaven knows what else? The CDC. Who would now be their own regulator? You guessed it, the CDC. This is a recipe for no accountability, a recipe for disaster, a recipe for rampant, unbridled control over the people. 

Officially, this bill simply brings together powers spread across several departments into one place. If that’s really the case, why does the bill have a price tag of $250 million for the first three years and $73 million per year after that? Shouldn’t the cost of the CDC be offset through savings in other departments? If that’s all they intend, then that would be true. Clearly the Australian CDC will be doing much, much more. You’re given them the money to do it, and they’ll be doing it away from prying eyes and protected with freedom-of-information blocks and negligible reporting criteria, regulating itself and sending the bill to the taxpayers. In nine years in the Senate, this is one of the worst bills I’ve dealt with. Minister, I’ve given you many questions. I’d like some answers. 

This exchange during Senate Estimates with the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) sums up just how bad Estimates has become under the Albanese Labor Government.

The TGA is well aware that Senators only have a few minutes to ask questions, and they understand that the more they can stall, the less likely it is they’ll have to say anything that could cause problems for their Minister—regardless of the truth. Because of this, the Minister will not require the “witness” to answer the question, nor will the Committee Chair—both of whom are Labor Senators.

My first question was a genuine attempt to clarify misinformation circulating online about aluminium intake. The answer was a simple “yes.” Keep that in mind when you watch the video. Instead of confirming the obvious and allowing us to move on to another question about aluminium in vaccines, the opportunity was taken to stall for time by debating whether the question should even be asked at all. Dr. Lawler, Deputy Secretary of the Health Products Regulation Group within the Department of Health, oversees the agencies and committees the Government uses to spread responsibility, avoiding accountability. He was exactly the right person to direct these questions to.

The data I presented was straightforward: the level of aluminium in vaccines is unsafe for infants by an order of magnitude. Yet the TGA spent a great deal of time on their pre-prepared responses insisting that vaccines are safe. They refuse to accept any data showing that this level of exposure is causing health issues in infants. I then asked whether our vaccines had been subject to gold standard testing—a term used on many occasions by “witnesses” attending Estimates to defend COVID vaccines – yet suddenly, the gold standard is no longer relevant to … vaccines! Suddenly, testing a product against a double-blind placebo (saline) is now considered “unsafe,” despite this being the standard for a century?

In reality, what Big Pharma has been doing for years—and what the TGA has allowed them to do in Australia—is to compare new vaccines (or medications for that matter) against existing ones, rather than saline. If the harm detected is the same as that already being caused by the “placebo” medication, it’s deemed safe. This is not how things should be.

I will continue this line of questioning until we get a proper inquiry into the level of heavy metal contamination in infant vaccines.

— Senate Estimates | October 2025

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: Thank you for being here again, especially Professor Lawler. Before I start, can we deal with a statement I hear on the internet all the time—that you get more aluminium in your food than you do in vaccines. Aluminium in food is ingested at 0.3 per cent. In vaccines, it’s ingested at 100 per cent. Individual results may vary. Is this a fair statement?  

Prof. Lawler: I’m not sure where you’re seeing that. I don’t have the information you’re referencing in front of me.  

Senator ROBERTS: I’m asking you whether it’s accurate.  

Prof. Lawler: I’m not sure that is necessarily a question for the TGA to respond to. We can provide you with information on the process that we undertake in terms of the evaluation and authorisation of therapeutic goods, including vaccines. Is this a claim that the TGA has made?  

Senator ROBERTS: No. That’s my understanding. What is the TGA’s recommended maximum daily intake of aluminium for a child aged six months, please?  

Prof. Lawler: By mouth as a recommended daily intake?  

Senator ROBERTS: Yes.  

Prof. Lawler: I don’t believe that the TGA sets a recommended daily ingestion of aluminium, Senator.  

Senator ROBERTS: What is the daily maximum for a child of six months that can ingest aluminium in food?  

Prof. Lawler: I would suggest that those are probably questions best posed to Food Standards Australia New Zealand, Senator.  

Senator ROBERTS: The US Food and Drug Administration recommends exposure of five micrograms per kilogram in infants. At six months, the average weight of an infant is seven kilograms, making the maximum daily exposure 35 micrograms. The Infanrix hexa vaccine contains 825 micrograms of aluminium per dose, which is 24 times its safe daily limit. Do you accept injecting children at 23 times the safe level? Do you accept that this unsafe aluminium exposure is a contributing factor to aluminium derived autism?  

Prof. Lawler: I will throw to Dr Dascombe in a moment. I will answer a couple of the things there in reverse order, if I may. The first is that, in answer to your second question, no. I don’t believe that there is a recognised regulator—I’m happy to be corrected—that does.  

Senator ROBERTS: Rather than relying on someone else, do you have any data or research?  

Prof. Lawler: I’m just trying to answer your question. I don’t believe that there is another regulator. I’m just using that as back-up. We have seen no credible safety signal that aluminium load either in single or scheduled immunisation delivery is a contributor to autism. The second thing I would say is that I am not sure this is the forum, nor do we have the time, to clarify the distinction between injected and ingested aluminium. They are quite different biomechanical processes. I don’t think the two are comparable. I will ask Dr Dascombe to add to that answer.  

Dr Dascombe: I echo the comments of Professor Lawler. Neither the TGA nor any international regulator has detected or confirmed any safety signals relating to any vaccine and autism. This is also supported by the weight of scientific evidence.  

Senator ROBERTS: What is the TGA guidance for the injection of multiple vaccines into a six-month-old at the same time causing amplified aluminium? Each of those doses has aluminium adjuvant, a preservative, so each of them is 24 times the daily safe limit.  

Prof. Lawler: My apologies for breaking in, Senator. There are a couple of points on that. It is not the practice or the role of the TGA to make recommendations on immunisation schedules. That sits within the province of ATAGI, the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation. I would also highlight that we have frequently responded to questions around the aluminium load in the vaccination schedule and their consequences. Most recently, but perhaps more recently, is a Senate question on notice 24-003075. We have discussed it in this place a number of times.  

Senator ROBERTS: You see the problem. Just one vaccine can be 24 times over the safe daily limit. You are recommending injecting multiple of them at the same time. These infants could be getting over 100 times the safe limit and you just keep on injecting them right in there and then claim aluminium poisoning isn’t the reason they come down with autism in some cases the very next day. How can you justify this?  

Prof. Lawler: I will answer those questions in reverse order, if I may. I will answer the second. There is no indication that the vaccination schedule is linked to autism. Indeed, it has been highlighted not just today but previously. There’s no credible evidence that there is a linkage between vaccination and autism. As I just indicated in my previous answer, it is not the role of the TGA to recommend vaccinations. We assess them for safety, quality and efficacy. It’s the role of ATAGI to recommend the vaccination schedules.  

Senator ROBERTS: Why don’t you tell the pharma companies to reduce the aluminium preservatives down to safe levels so you can get parents to trust your vaccine again and the parents can trust your advice again?  

Prof. Lawler: There are a couple of elements in your question. We evaluate the submissions from sponsors and evaluate the process of manufacture and quality control to ensure that the balance of risk versus benefit is appropriate. That is a determination that we make not only in the authorisation but also in the post-market monitoring through our pharmacovigilance of any therapeutic good with the inclusion of vaccines. In terms of trust, we recognise that there is an active campaign to undermine the trust of regulators, the TGA particularly. We undertake to restore or bolster the trust of the public, which I have to say was during the pandemic and is still, despite some narratives, at a high level. We seek to do that through education and guidance. We do that through being very clear and transparent about what we do and by addressing dis- and misinformation when and if it occurs.  

Senator ROBERTS: How many vaccines in the Australian schedule have been subject to a gold standard trial, meaning specifically a randomised double blind placebo control study where the placebo is saline and not another vaccine?  

Prof. Lawler: I recognise that you weren’t here before lunch. We had a conversation with Senator Antic regarding the use of the term ‘gold standard’. We recognise that the use of a placebo control randomised double control trial—there are a number of different terminologies used—is of a very high standard and presents robust and dependable evidence. The challenge, of course, is whether something constitutes a gold standard in the way that you have used it. It actually very much depends on context. We use controlled or blinded trials or placebo trials when we are interested in determining the difference between a control arm and an intervention arm. This is really effective when we’re looking at incremental improvements in therapies or when we’re looking at the introduction of new therapies. The challenge we have, of course, is that when there is an established therapy that has been shown over decades using both documented and real-world evidence to be both safe and effective, it is ethically questionable—and, in some instances, ethically indefensible—to use a placebo in that non-intervention arm. I will give you two examples, if I may. We have vaccine preventable diseases, and we have a very clear demonstration of reduction in not only mortality but morbidity in those diseases. Let’s choose polio and small pox, diseases that have had a specific impact for many decades and have led to untold suffering. One of them has been eradicated by the use of vaccines and one of them has been virtually eradicated. If we were to introduce placebo controlled trials for those drugs, that would be horrendously unethical. We would be essentially and knowingly infecting children with a disease that could kill, paralyse or maim when we know that there is a way of preventing that. That’s not ethically defensible.  

Senator ROBERTS: What you are saying is that there has been no double blind placebo control study where the placebo was saline and not another vaccine?  

Prof. Lawler: No. What I am saying is that would not be an appropriate approach to be taking today with the vaccines we use.  

Senator ROBERTS: Has it been taken in the past?  

Prof. Lawler: I also would highlight that the introduction of vaccines occurred some time ago. And also—  

Senator ROBERTS: So it has not been done?  

Prof. Lawler: I will let you finish.  

Senator ROBERTS: So it has not been done, then, the tests?  

Prof. Lawler: Whether these—  

Senator ROBERTS: A double blind trial?  

Prof. Lawler: Well, we’ve actually already taken on notice to provide concrete evidence on which of those vaccines has been subjected previously to blinded control trials.  

Senator ROBERTS: How many COVID vaccines have been destroyed because they aged out? What was the purchase cost for those products?  

Prof. Lawler: Dr Anna Peatt from the national immunisation division will respond to that.  

CHAIR: This is your last question, Senator Roberts.  

Dr Peatt: Senator, could you please repeat the question? I didn’t quite hear it.  

Senator ROBERTS: Certainly. How many COVID vaccines have been destroyed because they aged out? What was the purchase cost for those products?  

Dr Peatt: Senator, I would have to take that question on notice. I don’t have that available with me today.  

Senator ROBERTS: Was close to 35 per cent of the multibillion-dollar COVID vaccine supply binned or trashed?  

Dr Peatt: I would have to take that question on notice.  

Senator ROBERTS: I am asking for you specifically to tell us whether or not it was 35 per cent.  

Dr Peatt: I don’t have that figure in front of me.  

Senator ROBERTS: I am asking for you to just say what the figures are. Can you confirm that is 35 per cent of what we bought?  

Dr Peatt: Yes, I can do. 

✅ 100% agree!

Sourced from Secretary Kennedy on X @SecKennedy:

Medical decisions should be made based on one thing: the wellbeing of the person—never on a financial bonus or a government mandate.

Doctors deserve the freedom to use their training, follow the science, and speak the truth without fear of punishment.

The largest ever study (QoVAX) comparing COVID injected to non-injected patients has been stopped without explanation, and Queensland Health is on track to destroy all of its samples and evidence.

Losing the last evidence that could inform a truly objective assessment of the effects of the injections wouldn’t just be a tragedy, it could be a crime.

I’m putting Queensland Health bureaucrats on notice. Do NOT destroy these samples and evidence – allow the study to complete so that the data can be shared for all Australians.

Transcript

This building could become the biggest crime scene in Australia.

I’m standing outside the Queensland Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital, Metro North, where Queensland Health intends to cover up and destroy evidence of the COVID vaccine fraud.

In 2021, a major research project, the QoVAX study, started researching 10,600 biospecimens from donors injected with the COVID-19 injections and from donors not injected.

The study was considering effectiveness and outcomes of being injected versus non injected.

It was to be the largest study of this nature in the world to date.

After only 18 months, the $20 million programme was shut down suddenly and without warning and with no valid reason provided. The donors were not even consulted, and neither were senior scientists running the study.

Metro North now intends to destroy the data and specimens, even though they’ve been informed of pending legal action to preserve the valuable data and evidence in the samples and material.

Destroying the samples would be a crime. Punishment for all responsible could include gaol time and massive fines.

The Human Research and Ethics Committee and board members of Metro North are failing in their duty and oversight responsibilities. This may make them culpable.

Why do these bodies wish to destroy the samples and data? What are they trying to hide?

Papers are about to be completed and published for the first 18 months of the research. If the research reveals problems with the COVID shots, it would embarrass Queensland Health bureaucrats and politicians. That’s motive for destroying the samples and the evidence.

If the research reveals no problems with the shots, why would Queensland Health not release the data and conclusions?

With a $4 billion annual budget, Queensland Health’s Metro North can afford to continue storing the samples and preserve the data.

I call for this decision to be immediately withdrawn and steps taken to preserve the specimens and reinstate this vital programme to provide conclusions as to the nature and effects of the COVID injections.

I’m sending letters to raise this issue with the Premier of Queensland, the Minister for Health and the Attorney General.

This is just another reason why Prime Minister Anthony Albanese must call a royal Commission into the entire COVID response.

Letters to Queensland’s Premier, Attorney-General and Minister for Health

One Nation will restore direct oversight, supervision, accountability, and control to Parliament, removing influence from pharmaceutical companies over drug and product approvals.

Recently the head of the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) Professor Skerrit left his role at the TGA and commenced work with Medicines Australia, which is the lobby group for the pharmaceutical industry. In effect, the professor is now working for the companies he recently regulated.

This is entirely unacceptable. The health of everyday Australians and trust in the medical establishment is too important to leave in the hands of a broken system rife with cronyism and self-interest.

We will return the power to authorise drugs and medical devices back to the Minister for Health, who will be responsible for delegating these decisions to his own departmental staff.

This system will ensure that the Minister’s decisions will be subject to rigorous parliamentary scrutiny, prevent conflicts of interest and most importantly remove the direct relationship between the TGA and pharmaceutical companies they are supposed to regulate.

Security of employment in the public service should prevent the revolving door we currently have between the TGA and pharmaceutical companies and ensure the best possible outcome for everyday Australians.

Dengue fever is a viral illness spread by the Aedes aegypti mosquito (known as the dengue mosquito in north Queensland). The dengue virus is not endemic in Australia, meaning the virus is not normally present in Australia.

Dengue fever outbreaks begin when someone is infected with dengue overseas and arrives with the virus in their blood. This is referred to as an imported case. When a local Aedes aegypti mosquito bites an infected person, it in turn becomes infected with the virus and can then transmit it to others through subsequent bites. These instances are known as locally acquired cases.

The dengue virus does not spread directly from person to person.

Catching different types of dengue, even years apart, increases the risk of developing severe dengue. Severe dengue causes bleeding and shock, and can be life-threatening. There have been deaths in Queensland from severe dengue. This is why a vaccine is problematic, because that relies on giving the subject the disease.

About Oxitec and Their Process

Oxitec’s genetically modified mosquitoes work by releasing sterile males into the wild to mate with females, which results in offspring that die in the larval stage. Oxitec’s mosquitoes are engineered with a self-limiting gene that produces a non-toxic protein that prevents their offspring from surviving to adulthood. The protein, called tTAV, disrupts the cell’s ability to function and prevents the insect from developing normally.

The gene can be switched off using amoxicillin, which allows the factory to breed the mosquitoes, then once in the wild, the amoxicillin wears off and the gene starts producing the protein again.

In short – it’s gene editing, hence the need for the application to the Office of the Gene Technology regulator.

Our CSIRO is a proponent | https://www.csiro.au/en/news/all/news/2024/december/csiro-oxitec-to-tackle-disease-spreading-mosquitoes-threatening-mainland-australia

“Launched today, Oxitec Australia is a collaboration between CSIRO, Australia’s national science agency, and UK-based Oxitec Ltd, the leading developer of biological solutions to control pests.“

And look who is running the show – “Professor Brett Sutton, Director of Health & Biosecurity at CSIRO, said Oxitec Australia is now seeking partners to accelerate its activities and product development in Australia.”

When I said it was a template, this is confirmed in the CSIRO press release:

“This technology platform could also be used to develop solutions for a wide spectrum of pests that threaten livestock and crops and our food systems.”

Oxitec are running field trials on a fall armyworm with the same gene added, which is a moth not a mosquito. And it’s our money going into this so Estimates is fair game:

“Oxitec Australia is also developing an Aedes albopictus (Asian tiger mosquito) solution, with funding from CSIRO, to help prevent a major invasion risk to mainland Australia. “

Mosquito Performance in Brazil

Oxitec launched a year-long field trial in Indaiatuba, Brazil in 2018. The trial involved releasing Oxitec’s Friendly™ Aedes aegypti in four communities. The trial’s results included an average of 89% peak suppression in two communities treated with a low release rate of mosquitoes according to Oxitec. Brazil’s Dengue rate was low in 2018, and jumped up in 2019 and later. The locals are claiming a connection but there is no science around what that connection could be.

Gates Foundation however washed their hands of the Brazil Dengue escalation with this statement:

“A spokesperson at the Gates Foundation told AFP that the foundation ‘does not fund any of Oxitec’s work involving Aedes aegypti mosquito release in Brazil.’ 

NOT exactly a debunking of the controversy.

People are asking if the explosion in Dengue in Brazil the year after the trial was related, especially when the same thing happened after a similar trial for Zika. It is a question that should be addressed, although I do think it is not connected.

Florida 2021 – Nothing Went Wrong

Oxitec ran a controlled release in Florida in 2021. A kill rate of 90% was proven, with no known unintended consequences. HOWEVER, there was an increase in Dengue the following year and the same thing happened with the Zika test in Brazil. The reason this isn’t related is the genotype:

“We documented an unprecedented number of travel-associated and locally acquired DENV-3 cases in Florida during May 2022–April 2023; circulation of the DENV-3 genotype III was recently identified in the Americas. Our investigation illustrates that local transmission and spread in Florida was limited, despite multiple introductions from outside the country. Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis revealed that cases were from the same DENV-3 genotype III lineage and were highly related to one another and to cases identified in Puerto Rico, Arizona, and Brazil.”

https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/30/2/23-1615_article

So the outbreak was not spontaneous in the area of the trial, but was introduced from outside.

Dengue Vaccine and the Philippines Scandal

Sanofi Pasteur owns the Dengvaxia® vaccine – the first licensed dengue vaccine and available in more than 20 countries. It is registered with the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) in Australia, but is not currently marketed here.

WIKIPEDIA: “The Philippine Department of Health began in 2016 a programme in three regions to vaccinate schoolchildren against dengue fever, using Dengvaxia supplied by Sanofi Pasteur. On 29 November 2017, Sanofi issued a caution stating that new analysis had shown that those vaccinated who had not previously been infected with dengue ran a greater risk of infection causing severe symptoms. On 1 December 2017, the Philippine DOH placed the programme on hold, pending review. Over 700,000 people had received at least one vaccination at that point.[11][12] Since the announcement by Sanofi, at least 62 children have died, allegedly after receiving a vaccination. The victims’ parents blamed the dengue vaccine for the deaths of their children.”

Most of the deaths were caused by internal bleeding in the heart, lungs and brain, which are symptoms of haemorrhagic dengue.

Sanofi announcement confirms facts:

Wikipedia with references: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dengvaxia_controversy

Is this an Attempt to Create a Disease Just to Sell the vaccine?

Comparison of death rates from the vaccinated and unvaccinated suggests the vaccine offers some benefit, but that is mostly based in areas and demographics where health services are poor. It is best answered by offering mobile health services in affected areas. This Australia can do, whereas maybe the Philippines can’t.

The vaccine is listed in Australia – but hasn’t been used. The Philippines incident was the last known use of the vaccine, and the victim’s court case is still underway. Given Sanofi’s admissions around the vaccine and WHO’s advisory that a serology test is needed before giving the vaccine to a person to ensure they haven’t had the disease before, I doubt this is a vaccine play.

The mRNA version of the vaccine was trialled and rejected in 2014 because it didn’t work. It’s not an attempt to feed work to Pfizer’s new mRNA factories in Australia. There are new vaccines coming through but they have the same problem – making the disease worse in people who have had it before.

Some Mosquitoes Replicate

4% of the mosquitoes in the Brazil test lived and replicated. No work appears to have been done on what happened to the offspring – were they normal or were they mutated and if so, what is the effect of that mutation?

Could a mutated progeny cause a mutation in the virus (Dengue, Zika, Yellow Fever, Malaria) which causes it to become more dangerous, infectious, etc. This is a major question to be answered – capturing and testing mosquitoes in the wild to look for mutations, and that work has not been done. It must be an element of the OGTR approval.

Mosquitoes have a life cycle of 7 – 10 days. Fall army worms (FAW) live 6 – 8 weeks, so they are present in the environment longer but not significantly so.

Cane Toad Disaster at Risk of Repeating