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In Senate estimates, I asked questions about the Brereton Afghanistan inquiry and its implications for integrity in public office. When Mr Brereton wrote his report, he declared that command responsibility for alleged war crimes did not extend to senior officers or headquarters. That raises serious concerns.

I pressed officials on whether Mr Brereton had close associations with those officers and whether this pattern of judgment affects his fitness to lead the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). The response confirmed that while his association was professional, he continued to provide advice on the inquiry—even after becoming commissioner.

Australians deserve confidence that those tasked with fighting corruption are beyond reproach. Transparency and accountability are not optional—they are essential.

What do you think? Should prior involvement in controversial inquiries disqualify someone from heading an anti-corruption body?

— Senate Estimates | October 2025

Transcript

Senator ROBERTS: When Mr Brereton wrote his Afghanistan inquiry report he declared that command responsibility and accountability for war crime allegations does not extend to senior officers and headquarters, joint taskforce 633 and the joint operations centre. Did he know any of those officers well, or did he have a close association with any of those officers?

Mr Reed: That report was produced before the National Anti-Corruption Commission began and therefore—

Senator ROBERTS: I’m going to—

Mr Reed: I’m not in a position to be able to tell you about—

Senator ROBERTS: Do you know?

Mr Reed: I can’t advise you on that.

Senator ROBERTS: Do you know?

Mr Reed: No, I don’t.

Senator ROBERTS: Could you take it on notice to ask Mr Brereton, please?

Mr Reed: I’m not sure. Is it relevant?

Senator ROBERTS: Yes, it is, because it’s going to the commissioner’s fitness for the job of heading up the NACC and establishing whether there’s a pattern of behaviour here. There seems to be a pattern of behaviour, from what I can tell.

Mr Reed: I’ll pass to my colleague Rebekah O’Meagher.

Ms O’Meagher: Thank you, Philip. If it assists, in terms of the previous line of questioning, the commissioner has put it on the record that, in terms of that association, it was a professional one, not a friendship. It was a historic—

Senator ROBERTS: I’m not doubting that.

Ms O’Meagher: professional association. As to the reasoning of how that error of judgement occurred, those referrals came to us in the third day of our operation as the commission, and the commissioner has explained that he maintained involvement—not decision-making but involvement—because it raised issues in terms of the breadth of corrupt conduct under the act. That was the reasoning. He declared what the conflict was on multiple occasions. He stated how he was going to manage it. And another deputy was the decision-maker for the referrals.

Senator ROBERTS: Has the NACC received any referrals or complaints in relation to the Afghanistan inquiry that Mr Brereton conducted?

Mr Reed: It’s not something I’m going to be able to answer here.

Senator ROBERTS: Can you take it on notice please?

Mr Reed: Yes.

Senator ROBERTS: Has Mr Brereton recused himself from the complaints against the Afghanistan inquiry, or does he need the inspector-general to tell him to do that again?

Ms O’Meagher: The commissioner has stated that he will recuse himself, and he has recused himself, from all matters involving that IGADF.

Senator ROBERTS: Has he continued to provide advice to the inspector-general of the ADF on the Brereton report? He has, hasn’t he?

Mr Reed: That’s what we were talking about earlier—

Senator ROBERTS: That’s right.

Mr Reed: and the answer is yes. But it was advice, not regular or structured but infrequent.

Senator ROBERTS: Can you confirm, Mr Reed, if there have been any complaints to the NACC about the Brereton report? He’s not advising the NACC?

Mr Reed: If it was a referral to the National Anti-Corruption Commission about the IGADF—

Senator ROBERTS: And the Brereton report.

Mr Reed: he would recuse himself from that matter.

The National Anti Corruption Commission (NACC) has passed Parliament and will be established next year.

So what’s covered by the NACC and what is One Nation’s view on these issues? I spoke on this in Parliament this week.

Something to tackle corruption is long overdue, we’re looking forward to having this body up and running and fine tuning it so that corruption is punished.

Transcript

As a servant to the people of Queensland and Australia, I support the National Anti-Corruption Commission Bill 2022. Shoddy governance is Australia’s greatest problem and biggest threat. The absence of data in making policies and legislation—some parties go to great lengths to avoid data and substitute emotion. That is partly corruption, but this bill that we are discussing today goes to real corruption, illegal corruption.

Initially I thought parliament contained the procedures for self-accountability. After two years, I realised I was wrong. Then I started participating enthusiastically in presentations and discussions in this building and outside, around a national crime and corruption commission. I thank that many people I listened to—lawyers, judges, former judges and everyday Australians concerned about corruption. I appreciate the conversations that I had with former senator Bill Heffernan. I realised when I spoke out about the fact that we need to have a commission in place to provide oversight of four main groups: federal members of parliament, federal bureaucrats and public servants, federal judges and federal police.

Now I turn to the government’s proposal. For too long corruption in government has been almost impossible to deal with because current protections are totally inadequate. Each state has a body to deal with corruption at the state level of government. All the state bodies, however, face jurisdictional and evidential hurdles. Whistleblower protections, particularly for private-sector whistleblowers, have failed to provide assumed protections. In recent years, many whistleblowers have had their lives and/or careers publicly and privately trashed—destroyed. Some have faced criminal charges or been destroyed financially through civil actions.

Integrity as an expected attribute of those in public office has been invisible and left to chance. That lack of integrity destroys the people’s trust in the governance of this country. This bill, when passed with appropriate amendments, will go a long way towards setting up a workable scheme, ensuring that integrity becomes a fundamental feature of our legislative and executive arms of government.

To get this bill right, a number of issues need to be addressed through internal or external amendment. One thing this bill does not address is third-party corrupt conduct, where the person being dealt with is an otherwise innocent public official dragged unknowingly into a circle of corruption. This is a scenario included within the jurisdictions of most state anticorruption bodies, except those of Tasmania and Western Australia. To be comprehensive, the bill must include this scenario to ensure that corruption, even involving innocent public officers, can still be investigated for corruption.

It’s important to understand that this bill is not designed to be purely or only punitive. It’s much more than that. It’s designed to get to the root cause of corrupt processes, practices and systems, to rectify, eliminate and prevent corruption and to systematically do that and systematically prevent corruption. This provision will assist in identifying relationships vulnerable to abuse and exploitation so that processes may be introduced to provide effective risk management, oversight and accountability. This will be an alternative to relying on the ability to satisfy the restrictive requirements of proving crime beyond reasonable doubt. That’s highly restrictive. We need better than that. Another power that should be clarified in the bill is the commission’s power to commence investigation of its own volition, without being reliant on external referrals from other agencies and individuals. This clarification would ensure that the source of complaints or information did not limit the full ambit of justification for investigations.

The issue of public hearings has challenged those in favour generally of establishing this commission. It has been suggested that holding public hearings may expose a person to vilification of their reputation, and potentially there may be insufficient evidence to establish an offence. People are worried that this will be used as a mechanism to turn into unjustifiable political witch-hunts, as we’ve seen in some of the states. This was one of my concerns, and it was the reason for my rejection of the bill in its earlier form. To address this, the bill indicates that hearings may be held in private unless the commissioner is satisfied that exceptional circumstances—exceptional circumstances, as it says in the bill—justify holding the hearing in public and it’s in the public interest to do so. The phrase ‘exceptional circumstances’, if included in the bill, would make it virtually impossible to hold public hearings, as it would require a court to determine whether circumstances are in fact exceptional. That’s a lawyer fest for sure. The removal of the requirement for exceptional circumstances is essential, and there are proposed amendments before the Senate that will fix this problem. I support these amendments. It would be appropriate that, if a public hearing were held, the commissioner or a deputy commissioner preside, because they are legally qualified to deal with the more obvious legal issues.

Another concern raised with me is the composition of the proposed parliamentary joint committee, where the chair is required to be a member of the government. This raises questions on the independence of the joint committee. A better solution may be that the chair should not be a member of a political party forming government or should at least be a person enjoying bipartisan support of the committee. It’s important that an extensive whistleblower protection authority be established to ensure protection for genuine disclosures. The government assures me that the introduction of such an authority is imminent and an essential supportive element of this bill’s operation.

Next, I raise what Senator Bill Heffernan has raised with me in extensive personal discussions, as well as senior judges and practitioners of the law. What’s missing from this bill is the jurisdiction to overview the misconduct and actions of the judiciary. This option is desperately needed, and there is information showing that this jurisdiction has been overlooked for far too long. It needs to be included—it must be included. It would be welcome to think that our judges are all free from human weaknesses, but they’re human. In practice, it’s not a realistic conclusion that they are free from human weaknesses. Judges are human and susceptible to the human frailties that may lead to misconduct in their offices. We know that. The judiciary must have a mechanism that provides independent review of the conduct of its members.

I look forward to the development of a bill to cover judges and senior police and associated amendments to strengthen the safeguards designed to protect our society from evildoers hiding behind public office—a bill the government has flagged with us. The Australian public deserves protection and reassurance. The people deserve integrity. To be effective, government must be trusted. We do not have trust in governance at the moment, but that’s what we need. We have one flag above this building, one flag for the nation. We are one community. We are one nation. And we support the integrity of our political representatives and public officers whose duty is one of service to the people.